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Abstract: At the most basic level, a prosocial behavior is any voluntary behavior of which 
the main purpose is to benefit another individual (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Krebs, 
2015), but does not provide benefit to the acting individual.  Healthy emotional 
development provides a foundation for the development of prosocial motives and their 
subsequent behaviors, especially those emotions specifically related to empathic 
responding.  Empathy, an affective response involving the sharing and understanding of 
the emotions of another, is considered a primary motive for the emergence of prosocial 
behaviors. Precursors of both empathic and prosocial responding are evident within the 
first year and even the first months of life and continue to strengthen and increase in 
complexity across infancy and early childhood.   
 
 Previous research has demonstrated a preference for individuals who behave 
prosocially, as opposed to antisocially, in infants as young as 3 months of age (Hamlin et 
al., 2010).  It has also been suggested that by 18 months of age infants may be evaluating 
the equitable and inequitable distributive actions of others as being either prosocial or 
antisocial behaviors, respectively (Geraci & Surian, 2011). This previous work has 
focused exclusively on the agents of the distributive actions. The purpose of the current 
study is to focus on the recipients of those actions, i.e., to determine if infants engage in 
social evaluations directed toward the individuals who are on the receiving end of 
prosocial and antisocial distributive behaviors.  Specifically, this study assesses infant 
responses toward receivers that have been treated antisocially to determine if infants are 
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The development of prosocial behavior – any behavior that is intended to benefit 
another (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998) – is an increasingly popular topic that has gained the 
interest of researchers in recent years. In both research and anecdotally, antisocial 
behaviors (i.e. behaviors intended to harm another) are more highly publicized due to the 
lack of conformity to social and societal norms and to the social consequences that 
accompany typical antisocial behaviors such as aggression. In reality, prosocial behaviors 
occur far more frequently than their anti-social counterparts and are distinct from other 
behaviors in that a prosocial response requires one individual’s ability to understand and 
interpret the demonstrated ‘need’ of another (Dunfield, Kuhlmeier, O’Connell, & Kelley, 
2011). The importance of prosocial behaviors is evident across various social situations 
and can be seen in the quality of social interactions and relationships. In fact, social and 
emotional connectedness are paramount to an individual’s ability to function during 
social interactions (Roth-Hanania, Davidov, & Zahn-Waxler, 2011), and a failure to 
connect with others through these mechanisms is often indicative of a variety of 
psychological disorders (Baron-Cohen, 2002). From an early developmental perspective, 
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this social and emotional connectedness allows for infants to communicate with their 
caregivers, create social bonds, and gain an understanding of appropriate emotional 
responses across a variety of social contexts. 
  Healthy emotional development provides a foundation for the development of 
prosocial motives and their subsequent behaviors, especially those emotions and 
behaviors specifically related to empathic responding.  Empathy, an affective response 
involving the sharing and understanding of the emotions of another, is considered a 
primary motive for the emergence of cooperative and altruistic behaviors that are 
encompassed under the concept of prosociality. Unfortunately, much of the research that 
focuses on empathy and the prosocial behaviors related to this initial emotional response 
is conducted with child, adolescent, and adult participants and little is known about the 
emergence and the interaction of these behaviors in infants.  
The purpose of the proposed study was to determine if infants in their second year 
of life prefer receivers of resources that have previously been treated prosocially by 
another, or receivers that have been treated antisocially, thereby demonstrating an 
empathic emotional response to individuals that are victims of antisocial behaviors. The 
following chapter will provide an overview of the developmental theories that both deny 
and support the ability for infants to engage in this form of complex social evaluation. 
Furthermore, it will provide a review of the literature that has demonstrated the potential 
for infants to engage in social evaluations of prosocial and antisocial responding as well 








REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Prosocial Behaviors Defined 
At the most primitive level, a prosocial behavior is any voluntary behavior of 
which the main purpose is to benefit another individual (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Krebs, 
2015), but does not provide benefit to the acting individual.  These behaviors are often 
referred to as “other-oriented behaviors” (Dunfield et al., 2011) and broadly encompass a 
variety of behaviors including helping, cooperation, sharing and resource distribution, 
inequity aversion, altruism and moral reasoning (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006; 
Williams, Paulus, & Moore, 2014). However, it is often the topic of debate as to whether 
altruism and cooperation should be included in the realm of prosocial behaviors in that 
altruism involves a benefit to another at the cost of the acting individual and cooperation 
includes a shared goal between two individuals and may not rightfully be categorized as 
having a main purpose of benefiting another, but rather a main purpose of benefiting 
oneself (Dunfield et al., 2011). Regardless of these distinctions, this paper will focus on 
all behaviors encompassed under the broader concept of prosocial development in an 
attempt to understand the developmental trajectory, the factors that motivate these 
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behaviors, as well as highlight differential responding in individuals across various 
contexts, cultures, and ages. 
Prosocial behaviors include a variety of behaviors that focus on the instrumental, 
emotional, or material needs of other individuals and can be classified into three 
subcategories, including helping behaviors, comforting behaviors, and sharing behaviors 
(Dunfield et al., 2011).  Helping behaviors focus on the alleviation of an instrumental 
need of another individual and require both recognition of the receiving individual’s 
inability to perform a specific task and the helping individual’s response to assist in the 
completion of the task. Comforting behaviors focus on the alleviation of an emotional 
need and require the recognition of, and a response to, the negative emotional state of 
another.  Finally, sharing behaviors are any behaviors that reduce the material need of 
another individual.  These behaviors require the recognition of another’s lack of, and 
desire for, a material item, followed by a response of providing or sharing one’s own item 
with that individual. Often, one behavior by the prosocial actor will overlap across the 
three subcategories.  For example, the sharing of an item (sharing behavior) may also 
account for the emotional need (comforting behavior) of that individual as well.  The 
categorization of such behaviors that can account for multiple needs into one of the three 
subcategories is dependent on the acting individual’s original intent, or which goal he/she 
was initially trying to address.  
 Socialization, cognitive development, evolutionary adaptiveness, and empathy have 
all been hypothesized to be mechanisms linked with prosocial behaviors and their 
development (Dunfield, 2014). However due to the broad definition of prosociality and 
the various contexts in which prosocial behaviors occur and are therefore studied, an 
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understanding of the developmental trajectory of prosocial behaviors is largely debated 
(Zahn-Waxler, Radke- Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992). Therefore, identifying the 
various broad theories of prosocial development allows for a better understanding of their 
role in emotional development in early infancy. 
Theories of Developmental Trajectories 
Precursors of both empathic and prosocial responding are evident within the first 
year and even the first days of life when infants begin to respond to the distressed cries of 
their peers with their own cries of distress (Geangu, Benga, Stahl, & Striano, 2010; 
Martin & Clark, 1982; Simner, 1972). As they begin to develop the capacity to 
distinguish themselves from other individuals, and take on the role of those individuals, 
they subsequently begin to show concern for others through comforting and helping 
behaviors (Rheingold, 1982; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992). Additionally, infants begin to 
develop an understanding of social rules (Emde, Biringen, Clyman, & Oppenheim, 1991), 
an ability to regulate their emotions and behaviors (Kopp, 1982), an understanding of 
others emotions, and the capability of evaluating the actions of others based on moral 
standards (Kohlberg, 1981; Piaget, 1932). The combination of these complexities 
highlights the cognitive and socio-cognitive changes that facilitate the development of 
prosocial behavior over time.  
The understanding of prosocial development stems from a variety of theories 
including, cognitive development theory, psychodynamic theories, and social learning 
theories (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006). Each of these provides a primitive basis for 
understanding the developmental trajectory of this phenomenon, but none of which 
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provide an all-encompassing explanation as to how these behaviors develop and for what 
reasons.  
Theories Denying Prosocial Competency in Infants 
The cognitive developmental approach to prosocial behaviors focuses on 
children’s acquisition of such behaviors as a result of both moral and cognitive 
development across the lifespan. Early findings in the study of prosocial development 
provided supporting evidence that prosocial behaviors increase in frequency and 
complexity with age (Handlon & Gross, 1959; Ugurel-Semin, 1952).  Moral development 
stage theories of both Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1981) suggest that cognitive, moral, 
and prosocial development are intertwined and as children demonstrate advances in 
general cognitive development, their propensity for making moral judgments also begins 
to develop, which increases the likelihood that children will begin to engage in prosocial 
behaviors (see Appendix E, section 1).  With this in mind, classic cognitive approaches to 
prosocial development would deny the ability for infants to make moral judgments due to 
the cognitive capacities (i.e., perspective taking and self-other differentiation; discussed 
below) that these behaviors require and the age in later childhood at which they develop.    
Psychodynamic theories emphasize the unconscious while underscoring the role 
of emotion in the development of prosocial responding. Psychodynamic theories take one 
of two approaches to prosocial development. Classical Freudian theory (the first 
approach), like cognitive development theories, denies the ability for infants to engage in 
prosocial behaviors and instead focuses on these behaviors occurring in response to more 
advanced developmental processes, namely the conscience. Freud (1917) theorized that 
children begin to develop a conscience, or “superego”, between the ages of 4 and 6 years. 
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When this develops, prosocial behaviors may appear as a means of reducing guilt 
inflicted by the conscience (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006). In other words, 
prosocial behaviors may develop as a defense mechanism to placate the id’s irrational 
demands and reduce conflict between the id and the superego (Fenichel, 1945; Glover, 
1968, see also Appendix E, section 2). While this classic Freudian approach also denies 
the ability for infants to engage in prosocial responding, other psychodynamic theories 
provide a basis for its occurrence in early aged infants. 
Theories supporting prosocial competencies in infancy 
In contrast to classical Freudian psychodynamic theory, the other psychodynamic 
approach focuses on the importance of early interactions between the infant and the 
primary caregiver and provides the basis for explanation of observations of prosocial 
responding in infancy (Ekstein, 1978).  According to these neo-Freudian theorists, the 
infant-caregiver relationship is influential in the development of empathy, which is 
considered to be a necessary requirement for the development of prosocial behavior 
(discussed below). Attachment with primary caregivers provides infants with a safe 
environment to explore and understand their emotions (Bowlby, 1989) and infants use the 
information learned through attachment relationships to develop working models of 
social interactions that they can later use with their peers (Abraham & Kerns, 2013). In 
addition to links between empathy and prosocial behaviors, links between attachment 
security and empathy have been observed, finding that children that experience secure 
attachment were rated as more empathic and exhibited greater prosocial responses to 
distressed peers and adults (Kestenbaum, Farber, & Sroufe, 1989; van der Mark, 
IJzendoorn, & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2002).  
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Empathic responses do not just suddenly appear in childhood, however. Evidence 
suggests that newborn infants are capable of some form of empathy as is indicated by 
their reactive crying in response to the distressed cries of their infant peers (Martin & 
Clark, 1982; Sagi & Hoffman, 1976), a concept known as emotional contagion (discussed 
in more detail below). As infants age and develop higher levels of cognitive functioning, 
more advanced forms of empathic responding begin to emerge (Thompson, 1987), 
eventually developing into mature empathy. Brownell (2016) proposes a similar 
argument with regard to prosocial behavior, suggesting that “prosocial behavior emerges 
from human infants’ participation in a unique socioemotional environment [and these] 
socialization effects are not restricted to later childhood, but operate from birth to 
generate prosociality (p. 223).” In other words, prosocial behaviors develop progressively 
across infancy through precursory forms of sharing and turn taking behaviors that infants 
engage in with their primary caregivers (Brownell, 2011) rather than suddenly in the 
second year of life. This theory is supported by recent research on infants between 6 and 
15 months of age, indicating that infants understanding of fairness is (in part) governed 
by their ability to engage in spontaneous sharing behaviors toward primary caregivers 
(Ziv & sommerville, 2018).  Further, these immature prosocial interactions between 
infants and their primary caregivers encourage the emotions, behaviors, and cognitions 
that are critical to the development of prosociality.  Taken together this highlights the 
indirect, but important effects of primary caregiver attachment in prosocial development. 
Finally, social learning theories focus on a combination of both cognitive and 
environmental influences on prosocial development.  Specifically, this suggests that 
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prosociality is learned through the same mechanisms as any other behavior, namely 
reinforcement and imitation. Bandura (1977) stated that concrete and social 
reinforcements provide information as to which types of behavioral responses are 
appropriate and which are not in context-specific situations. Researchers have 
demonstrated the effectiveness of social reinforcements such as praise and approval on 
increasing prosocial tendencies in both infants and toddlers (Bryan, Redfield, & Mader, 
1971; Doland & Adelberg, 1967; Eisenberg et al., 1993; Midlarsky, Bryan, & Brickman, 
1973), indicating not only that social reinforcement is an important factor in prosocial 
development, but that it may be more influential than concrete reinforcements at 
encouraging children to engage in prosocial behaviors (Fabes, Fultz, Eisenberg, may-
Plumlee, & Christopher, 1989; Szynal-Brown & Morgan, 1983).   
Social Imitation. Research on social imitation has focused primarily on adults, 
but has provided a clear understanding that the imitation of facial expressions, postures, 
movements, and language has positive social consequences for both parties (Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1999; Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009).  Further research on imitation in adults has 
found that the positive social outcomes created by imitation have adaptive benefits for 
prosocial behaviors as well.  Individuals that have been mimicked are more likely to act 
prosocially toward another individual through, for example, helpful behaviors of 
retrieving dropped items and donating to charity following the imitating interaction (van 
Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004). Furthermore, this increase in 
prosocial tendency was not limited only to the imitator, but also increased the likelihood 
that the person being imitated would help third party individuals that had not been 
directly involved in the interaction.  
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Studies on infant and toddler preferences for imitation are not as extensive as the 
literature found for adults, but there are some relevant findings that provide evidence that 
infants, too, have a preference for mimickers and are likely to learn appropriate social 
responses from individuals that they deem to be reliable and relevant models of imitation 
(Koenig & Harris, 2005; Pea, 1982 Chow, Poulin-Dubois, & Lewis, 2008; Zmyj, 
Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum 2010, see also Appendix E, section 3). Research on 
infants between 9 and 14 months has indicated that infants can identify when they are 
being imitated by another and tend to look and smile more toward adults that imitate 
them as opposed to performing different actions, supporting the theory that even in 
infancy humans have a greater preference for individuals that are “like me” (Agnetta & 
Rochat, 2004; Mahajan & Wynn, 2012; Meltzoff, 1990; Meltzoff & Moore, 1999, see 
also Appendix E, section 3).  In a recent study, Carpenter, Uebel, and Tomasello (2013) 
extended the findings of a previous study by van Baaren et al., (2004) to determine if 18-
month-old infants would be more likely to perform prosocial actions after they had been 
mimicked by another. Van Baaren et al. (2004) found that adults were more likely to 
behave prosocially toward the experimenter and third-party individuals if the 
experimenter imitated the actions of the participant compared to if the experimenter did 
not imitate the participant’s actions. The imitative actions in the study of van Baaren et 
al. (2004) were subtle and predominately unconscious, including only postural imitation. 
However, in order for the imitative behaviors to be detected by infants, more exaggerated 
actions were required in this study.  Similar to the findings of van Baaren et al. (2004), 
18-month-old infants behaved prosocially toward another more frequently and more 
quickly after they had been imitated by the experimenter than they did when the 
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experimenter engaged in contingent play with the infants, but did not imitate their 
actions. Once again in keeping with the findings of the initial study by van Baaren et al. 
(2004), this increase in prosocial responding was not limited solely to the imitator, but 
affected uninvolved, third-party individuals as well.  
Literature on social imitation highlights the importance of modeling behaviors 
and imitation in the learning of prosocial behaviors in infancy and early childhood. 
Providing infants and toddlers with the opportunity to observe a model engaging in 
prosocial behaviors facilitates the understanding of which behaviors are appropriate in 
specific contexts and demonstrates to them how to initiate those behaviors.  This in turn 
will strengthen the learned disposition and increase the likelihood that the child will 
engage in these behaviors during future events. Furthermore, the nature of the 
relationship between the model and the imitating child will, in large part, determine the 
prosocial responses that are carried out in other contexts.  
Overall, theories of prosocial development range from the denial of ability for infants to 
engage in prosocial responding until early to middle childhood to the acceptance that 
infants can and do engage in prosocial behaviors through mechanisms of early caregiver 
interactions, reinforcement, and imitation. Therefore, each of the theories discussed 
above provides a basis for the initial understanding of how and when these behaviors 
develop, but none of which provide an all-encompassing explanation. Furthermore, these 
theories help explain the development of this phenomenon, but fail to explain what 
factors could motivate the occurrence of these behaviors, a necessary component to the 




Empathy as Prosocial Motivation 
Nowark (2006) theorized that individuals act prosocially toward one another 
primarily due to kin selection. Kin selection is a Darwinian theory that supports the 
helping of genetically- related individuals to increase reproductive success (Hamilton, 
1964). However, individuals are often observed behaving prosocially toward non-
genetically-related individuals. The theories of direct and indirect reciprocity (Nowark, 
2006, see also Appendix E, section 4) help account for this phenomenon, but researchers 
also point to empathy as a possible primary mechanism that motivates people to behave 
prosocially (Lockwood, Seara-Cardoso, & Viding, 2014). Empathy, the ability to share, 
understand and make inferences about the feelings of another individual, is thought to be 
associated with prosocial behavior on both an affective and cognitive level and 
neurophysiologists have linked empathic and prosocial responding to many similar neural 
circuits (see appendix E, section 5). In the last few decades, empathy has become of 
particular interest to psychologists, in part because of its implications for promoting 
prosocial actions (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Humans are not born as “social isolates” 
(Meltzoff, 2010). Rather, all of the actions of humans, including their thoughts and 
desires, occur in response to other individuals and due to the intensely social nature of 
humans it is necessary for individuals to have an understanding of not only their own 
emotions, but the feelings and emotions of individuals that they encounter (Batson, 
1990).  
According to Decety and Jackson (2004) there are three main components that 
define empathy.  The first is characterized by an emotional response to another 
individual’s emotional state.  This is typically accompanied by the sharing of emotions 
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with the other person and is more recently referred to as “emotional contagion.”  The 
second component involves perspective taking, which is the ability to understand the 
emotional experience or condition of another person. Perspective taking is a 
multidimensional skill that involves perceptual, social-cognitive and affective processes.  
An individual must first be able to visualize the perspective of another, followed by the 
identification and understanding of the reasoning behind a behavior, and finally surmise 
the feelings and emotions that the individual has as a result of the condition and behavior.  
The combination of these processes allows the individual to take on the perspective of 
another, which is critical, but not singularly responsible for the ability of an individual to 
perform prosocial actions (Moore, 1990). The third and final element of the cognitive 
definition of empathy requires the ability to distinguish between the emotions of one’s 
self and the emotions of another person, a process called self-other differentiation 
(Decety & Jackson 2004). Hoffman (1979; 1981) proposed a similar model to the one 
outlined by Decety and Jackson (2004) which included both an affective component and 
the cognitive component of self-other differentiation, but also included a final component 
which consists of prosocial behaviors performed with the sole intent of alleviating the 
distress of another individual.    
The first of these processes, emotional contagion – the automatic convergence of 
one’s emotional state with that of another individual – can be observed within the first 
hours of life in the form of contagious crying (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Moore, 1990). 
Contagious crying is an affective response that refers specifically to the distress reaction 
that neonates give when exposed to the cries of other infants. In early infancy the degree 
of intensity of responses to cries of distress varies from infant to infant. Although 
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contagious emotional responses vary in frequency and intensity between individuals, they 
can be observed in infants as early as a 24 hours after birth (Martin & Clark, 1982; 
Simner, 1971 see also Appendix E, section 6 for further review). While these findings 
provide evidence that the emotional contagion component of empathy is present within 
the first year of life, are infants capable of the cognitive capacities of perspective taking 
and self-other differentiation required for mature forms of empathy? 
Perspective taking and self-other differentiation are especially important when 
considering the role of cognitive empathy in the development of prosocial behaviors 
because they require an individual to consciously evaluate the emotional behaviors of 
another as well as understand that the emotions they feel are not necessarily their own, 
but often a result of the affect of others. Both of these components require complex 
cognitive processing, skills that Thompson (1987) argues do not develop until 
approximately 18 months of age.  However, recent research observing infant preferences 
of the prosocial and antisocial actions of third party individuals has challenged the denial 
of complex cognitive processing until the second half of the second year of life, 
suggesting that infants may be engaging in both perspective taking and self-other 
differentiation during paradigms depicting prosocial and antisocial behaviors. 
It is intuitively obvious that the actions of others are more readily evaluated when 
they affect oneself as opposed to surrounding strangers. However, Hamlin, Bloom, and 
Wynn (2007) found that even infants as young as 6 months of age will actively assess 
helping and hindering individuals in a given situation, even when the infants themselves 
are uninvolved in the interaction and completely unaffected by the actions of either the 
helper or the hinderer. Specifically, infants of both 6 and 10 months of age were shown a 
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protagonist agent attempting to climb a hill. This protagonist was either aided in the 
completion of its task by the helping agent, or kept from achieving its goal by the 
hindering agent. Choice measures used to indicate preference toward either the helping or 
the hindering agent (preference was indicated by either looking times or reaching 
behaviors dependent upon the age) resulted in nearly 86% of the 10-month-old infants 
indicating a preference for the helper and 100% of the 6-month-olds indicating a 
preference for the helper, thus suggesting that infants of this age have the capacity to 
evaluate the actions of others. These findings were later extended to 3-month-old infants 
who demonstrated preference through looking behaviors, indicating that social 
evaluations occur prior to an infant’s ability to show preference through reaching 
behaviors (Hamlin et al., 2010).  A second hill climbing paradigm with slight 
modifications to the agents was conducted to determine if infants were making 
evaluations of the agents based on the positive or negative nature of the helping event, or 
both. After pairing both the helper and the hinderer with a neutral character in the 
paradigm and the choice procedure, it was found that infants looked significantly longer 
at the neutral character compared to the hinderer, but did not look significantly longer at 
the helper character compared to the neutral.  This suggests that infants of this age may 
be averse to anti-social behaviors, but not necessarily attracted to prosocial behaviors, 
which suggests that negative social evaluations may be stronger, and therefore occur 
earlier in development than positive social evaluations. In theory, evaluations of the 
behaviors of acting agents when the infants are not directly involved in or affected by the 
interaction should provide some indication that infants are taking on the perspective of 
the agents directly involved in the paradigm.  By responding to the actions of the agents 
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based on how they perceive those actions, infants are demonstrating that they understand 
the perspective of the affected agent and the response that this agent should be having to 
being treated prosocially or antisocially. 
This theory is further supported in a second experiment by Hamlin et al. (2007) 
that assesses infant’s expectations of the protagonist’s behavior following it’s interaction 
with the helper and the hinderer. Using the same infants that had already made their 
social evaluations of the characters, the protagonist alternately approached either the 
hinderer or the helper, an action that was thought to either violate the infants’ 
expectations or did not, respectively. Interestingly, 10-month-old infants looked longer 
when the climber approached the hindering character, suggesting that the infants were 
surprised about this reaction, assuming that they expected the negatively-treated climber 
to show an aversion towards the character that had hindered it. Six-month-old infants 
demonstrated a different response and looked equally towards both events of approach to 
the helper and the hinderer, suggesting that even though they had preferred the helping to 
the hindering character, they did not attribute these attitudes to the protagonist as well. 
Therefore, infants may be developmentally capable of social evaluation prior to their 
ability to infer the evaluations of others (perspective taking), but this cognitive capability 
may strengthen in development between the ages of 6 and 10 months. It should be noted 
that these results were not replicated when the characters were inanimate objects (without 
distinct facial characteristics), which is consistent with the findings of Gredeback et al. 
(2015) that the p400 ERP, a neural component that has been linked to empathy and 
prosocial responding, does not activate when observing prosocial behaviors toward 
inanimate agents (see also appendix E, section 5). Additionally, in a hill climbing 
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paradigm similar to the one just discussed, it was found that older children of 3 and 5 
years old will not only indicate a preference for the helper over the hinderer, but as they 
age they begin to take intention of a goal into account as well (Li & Tomasello, 2018).  
More specifically, when a helping agent attempted to aid the climber up the hill, but 
failed; they were more positively evaluated than a hinderer that thwarted the climbers 
goal., but less positively evaluated compared to the helper that was successful in aiding 
the climber up the hill. These findings were more robust for 5 year olds compared to 3 
year olds, which provides further information as to the developmental trajectory of social 
evaluations.  
An alternative interpretation of these findings is that infants were not responding 
to the agents using cognitive rationale, but rather they were responding with a 
conditioned response after viewing an anti-social action that was socially inappropriate. 
So rather than consciously understanding that the agent and its behavior they observed 
was either “good” or “bad”, infants could be experiencing an underlying conditioned 
reaction that is motivating their preference, or lack of preference, for the prosocial agent 
or anti-social agent, respectively.  This would best be characterized as classical 
conditioning.  If the anti-social event in the various paradigms outlined above were to 
produce negative emotions in the infant, this could in turn affect their willingness to want 
to interact with or act prosocially toward the agent that evoked these negative feelings 
(the anti-social agent) based solely on the negative emotional valance associated with the 
agent rather than the cognitive evaluation of the agent. Consistent with this theory, 
Vondervoort and Hamlin (2016) propose that early moral evaluations in infants are 
emotion-based and rooted in intuition rather than cognition, which provides further 
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support that infants may be engaging in primitive forms of prosocial behavior that 
become more advanced as they develop the cognitive skills necessary to make true social 
evaluations. 
While classical conditioning is a viable alternative to the infant cognitive 
capacities approach, further research by Hamlin and Wynn (2011) increased the 
complexity of the initial prosocial/antisocial paradigm by providing more information 
about the agent’s previous actions and increasing the amount of information the infant 
would be required to retain in order to make complex social evaluations. In this paradigm 
infant evaluations of individuals who behaved negatively toward an antisocial individual 
were assessed.  Five- and 8-month-old infants were shown an agent working to reach a 
goal of removing a toy from a closed box.  In one scenario, a helper would demonstrate 
prosocial behavior by assisting the protagonist agent in opening the box allowing for the 
completion of the goal.  The alternative scenario depicted a hinderer behaving anti-
socially by keeping the protagonist from achieving its goal of opening the box.  
Following the initial distinction of the prosocial and anti-social individuals, infant 
subjects were placed in one of two conditions, the Prosocial Target condition and the 
Anti-social target condition.  In these, infants either observed a toy being taken away 
from a prosocial or anti-social agent by a new third-party agent, or retrieved and given 
back to the prosocial or antisocial agent by the third-party agent. Infants were then 
presented with these new “giving” and “taking” agents and provided a choice between 
the two agents to indicate their preference. Results indicated that both 5- and 8-month-old 
infants preferred the “giver” in the prosocial target condition, supporting previous 
findings that infants prefer to observe someone being treated prosocially.  However, 
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results of the Anti-social target condition differed between the 5 and 8-month-old infants.  
Five-month-old infants still preferred the “giver” in this scenario, regardless of the fact 
that the target agent had previously behaved negatively toward another individual. 
However, 8- month-old infants demonstrated a preference for the “taker”, indicating that 
they only prefer to see someone treated positively if they had previously acted positively 
themselves and preferred to see someone that had acted negatively be treated negatively 
in return. These findings are similar to those of Hamlin et al. (2007) in that the 
complexity of the social evaluations (and so cognitive capacities) may strengthen in 
development between 5 and 8 months of age.  Furthermore, these findings also support 
the theory of indirect reciprocity proposed by Nowak (2006), that social reputation may 
be a mechanism that explains prosocial behaviors between genetically unrelated 
individuals.  
These findings were once more expanded by Hamlin et al. (2011) to determine if 
the evaluations of the same social interactions conducted in the previously discussed 
experiments would affect the behaviors of older, just-verbal toddlers.  Eighteen-month-
old toddlers were placed in one of two conditions in which they could either give or take 
a treat away from the prosocial or anti-social agents.  Toddlers in the “give a treat” 
condition distributed treats more often to the prosocial rather than the anti-social agent.  
Similarly, toddlers asked to “take a treat” removed the treat from the anti-social agent 
more often than they removed a treat from the prosocial agent, suggesting that toddlers 
may have the cognitive capacities to understand that these responses are thought to be 
socially appropriate reactions to the behaviors previously exhibited by the agents.  
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The literature outlined above provides evidence that an understanding of prosocial 
and antisocial behaviors occurs in infancy and that this understanding allows for the 
social evaluation of agents that engage in these behaviors and emotional and behavioral 
responding to their outcomes. Additionally, the literature has provided an understanding 
of the structured paradigms and observations that are most often used to elicit prosocial 
and empathic responding in infants and young children.  These models have aided in 
informing much of what we already know about prosocial understanding and empathic 
responses to these behaviors. However, it should be noted that the findings of the 
research outlined above endow infants with a variety of cognitive capabilities that have 
been historically thought not to develop until late infancy and early toddlerhood (Piaget, 
1932). Furthermore, a handful of replications of the previous studies have failed to find 
significant results.  While these failures to replicate do not outweigh the number of 
studies that have found significant results, the importance of these studies to empathic 
and prosocial research cannot be overlooked.  
Failures to replicate. As briefly discussed, cognitive development does not 
provide the only explanation as to why these prosocial behaviors are occurring as this 
explanation endows infants with a significant amount of cognitive capacity when these 
behaviors may not actually involve a rational conscious cognitive process by the infant. 
Given the previous findings it is evident that research regarding the social evaluations of 
infants and toddlers has been successful.  However, a few studies have attempted the 
replicate the work of Hamlin and colleagues (2007; 2011) and have failed to find 
significant results. Specifically, a replication attempt of the Hamlin et al. (2007) hill 
paradigm was conducted and it was found that infants did not significantly prefer the 
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helping agent compared to the hindering agent (Scarf, Imuta, Colombo, and Hayne 2012).  
Rather, Scarf and colleagues theorized that the infants were actually responding to 
perceptual preferences of the paradigm rather than their social evaluations of the acting 
agents. For example, the original study involved a protagonist agent that attempted to 
make it up a hill and was either aided by a helping agent, or thwarted by a hindering 
agent. However, when the protagonist agent successfully reached the top of the hill it 
bounced to indicate its excitement for achieving its goal. In the replication by Scarf et al., 
it was found that across multiple conditions infants indicated preference for the agent that 
was associated with (and directly next to) the bouncing protagonist, regardless of whether 
that agent was the helper or the hinderer. Additionally, when the protagonist bounced 
during both the helping and hindering conditions, infants were found to prefer both the 
helping and hindering agents equally. 
Another attempted replication of the hill climbing study was recently conducted 
and found less than half of the infants chose the helping agent compared to the hindering 
agent (Colaizzi, 2016). Lack of replication in this study could have been due to minor 
methodological differences.  For example, Hamlin (personal communication, May 25, 
2016) found that infants tend to demonstrate a preference for the color blue (one of the 
colors of the agents). Though the roles of the agents were counterbalanced, this (in 
addition to various other minor methodological deviations) could have skewed the 
findings in this replication study.  
A third study attempting to replicate the findings of Hamlin and Wynn’s (2011) 
toy in the box paradigm was also unsuccessful. Salvadori et al. (2015) found that only 
62% of the infants in their replication paradigm demonstrated a preference for the helper 
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compared to the hinderer, which is inconsistent with the findings of Hamlin and Wynn 
(2011) that found a significant number of infants (79%) at both 5 and 8 months of age 
prefer the helper over the hinderer. Similar to Colaizzi (2016), Salvadori et al. (2015) 
attributed these differences to minor methodological dissimilarities of procedure, 
materials, or demographic.  However, the findings of Hamlin and Wynn (2011) were 
robust enough that they should still be evident in the face of only minor dissimilarities. 
One methodological issue that is not addressed with the original study and then again 
overlooked by Salvadori and colleagues (2015) is the noise that occurs when the box lid 
is slammed shut by the hindering agent. Although not outlined in the publication, in a 
recording of the paradigm (Hewitt & Bloom, 2013) there is a clear, audible noise when 
the hindering agent slams the lid of the box closed.  It is plausible that the infants have an 
aversion to a loud noise that causes them to react negatively toward the hindering agent, 
making it appear as though they are showing a preference toward the helping agent. This 
methodological issue should be addressed in further replications. Together these three 
studies provide evidence that the research on social evaluations and the conclusions 
drawn from their findings are not conclusive and remain questionable due to mixed 
results across this area of study.  
Nevertheless, there is a substantial amount of research that points toward an 
infant’s ability to socially evaluate the prosocial and anti-social actions of acting agents. 
This would support the conclusions of researchers in this area of study that infants have 
the capacity – cognitive or otherwise -- to engage in these social evaluations within the 
first year of life. Additionally, it is possible that the failed replication attempts are null 
results and deviations from the original findings are due to methodological differences. 
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However, if significant results are affected by only minor deviations from initial 
methodology, this calls into question the reality if the initial findings.  To gain a better 
understanding as to what factors are motiving infant preferences toward agents in these 
paradigms, new methodologies will need to be implemented to accurately assess an 
infant’s cognitive, emotional, and moral capacities. That said, environmental differences 
should be included as a potential motiving (or inhibiting) factor that needs to be further 
assessed to gain an understanding of environmental influence on prosociality. 
Resource distribution  
Throughout the developmental process, infants and young children will encounter 
many aspects central to social life that will require them to engage in complex social 
reasoning. A problem that will arise in these developmental periods concerns the fairness 
of distribution of resources.  Humans, as an ultra-social species, must remain in 
compliance with social norms to maintain a social human society.  A crucial theme to 
prosociality and norm compliance is fairness-based altruism.  Adults, non-human 
primates, and even dogs have been found to display negative responses to the unequal 
distribution of resources, specifically when the distribution represents reward allocation 
(Brosnan, Schiff, & Frans, 2005; Fehr & Rockenback, 2003). However, this 
understanding of equitable resource distribution has been found to begin in late infancy 
and strengthen throughout development (Geraci & Surian 2011; Ziv & Sommerville, 
2018). The question then arises, what constitutes the understanding of equitable division 
in children?  
By the age of two and even earlier, children begin to claim ownership of property.  
As early as 18 months of age an infant shows signs of distress in response to 
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relinquishing an item that he/she has claimed as their own and this issue of exclusivity 
and possession increases in frequency between 24 and 36 months of age, creating 
frequent argument and need for justification by the toddler (Dunn, 1988). Overall, these 
claims of ownership are a necessary component to sharing and distributive behaviors, 
those of which are encouraged across a variety of cultures as children begin to enter 
school settings and have increased social experiences (Tobi, Wu, & Davidson, 1989). 
Moreover, as toddlers near the age of three, they begin gaining an understanding of social 
power, a concept that is then linked to their claims of ownership through bargaining, 
trades, and distributions amongst peers (Rochat, et al., 2009). Harbaugh, Krause, Liday, 
and Vesterlund (2003) observed the bargaining and distributive behaviors across a variety 
of early childhood and adolescent ages and found that after these cognitive and social 
capacities develop, the likelihood that children will engage in fair resource distribution 
also increases. Furthermore, these egalitarian tendencies emerged above and beyond an 
individual’s own-self-interest in children over the age of seven.  Being that these 
cognitive and social capacities are found to emerge in late infancy and early toddlerhood, 
it can be theorized that these prosocial sharing and fairness behaviors begin to develop (at 
least in primitive form) within the first 2 years of life.  
Previous studies have reported evidence of infants under the age of 2 years 
forming egalitarian expectations regarding the distribution of resources.  Moreover, these 
infants in their first and second years of life demonstrate a more positive evaluation of 
egalitarian distributors compared to non-egalitarian distributors. For example, Geraci and 
Surian (2011) examined the ability for infants to evaluate subtle moral dilemmas 
involving the inequity of resource distribution. Twelve- and 18-month-old infants were 
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shown a series of paradigms in which a distributor would allocate resources to two 
receivers, either with equal distributions or unequal distributions. In the former scenario, 
the distributor evenly dispersed colorful discs to two receiving agents. The latter scenario 
resulted in the uneven dispersal of discs by the distributor to the two receiving agents, 
thereby providing one receiver with two colorful discs and the other receiver with none. 
Of the younger infants, there was no significant difference in preference between the fair 
and unfair distributors. However, the older infants looked significantly longer at the fair 
distributor when compared to the unfair distributor, demonstrating infant preference for 
the fair distributor. This would indicate that even in subtler tasks, infants appear to be 
able to evaluate the fairness of the behavior of others, though this ability is dependent on 
the age of the participant.  
Once again, however, these findings demonstrate an apparent contradiction 
regarding infant social evaluations when compared to the findings of Hamlin and Wynn 
(2011) in which both 5- and 8-month old infants were found to demonstrate a preference 
for prosocial agents over anti-social agents.  While Geraci and Surian (2011) found this 
preference to occur in older infants, they were unable to replicate a similar finding in 
their 12-month-old infants.  One major methodological difference that could explain 
these variations in findings is the use of a digital cartoon paradigm in the Geraci and 
Surian (2011) study (as opposed to puppets). It is possible that infants were not 
attributing social valences to digital agents in the same way that they would three-
dimensional agents and that by the 18-month assessment infants had overcome their 
inability to do so. Once again, these differences in findings could be due to the 
methodologies implemented and not reflect the actual emotional, cognitive, and moral 
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capacities of infants. Alternatively, it could be that, as Kagan (2008) suggested, 
preference as indicated by looking time may be a curvilinear as opposed to linear 
relationship. Either way, new methodologies should be addressed in future replications to 
aid in the understanding of these capacities. 
On the other hand, research supporting the findings of Geraci and Surian (2011) 
found that 15-month-old infants looked longer at the outcome of an event depicting a 
distribution of unequal resources compared to when they observed an event in which 
resources were distributed equally across agents (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011) 
presumably indicating that their expectations of the event outcome had been violated. 
While these looking behaviors may seem to conflict with the previous studies that 
measured infant preferences by longer looking times, it should be noted that in preference 
paradigms (e.g., Geraci & Surian), looking time at the agent(s) is being evaluated, but in 
violation of expectation paradigms (e.g., Schmidt & Sommerville), looking time at the 
event outcome is evaluated. Importantly, it was found that the previous emergence of 
spontaneous sharing behaviors with caregivers and peers was necessary to consistently 
elicit a violation of expectation in the infants.  According to Ziv and Sommerville (2018) 
infant’s understanding of fairness is related to their ability to perform sharing actions, 
which may influence how infants perceive distributive actions and allow for the 
development of an expectation of fairness. More specifically, infants that had already 
demonstrated sharing behaviors in a naturalistic setting looked longer at the unfair 
distributive outcome than infants that had not yet demonstrated sharing behaviors.  
Interestingly, even at a young age, both infants and toddlers appear to take 
external context variables into account when performing social evaluations. For example, 
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according to research by Olson and Spelke (2008), children as young as 3.5 years of age 
consider a variety of variables before distributing resources to another individual. First, 
children will assess the relationship between the distributer and receiver. The 
understanding of the degree of "closeness" between the two provides children with a 
context for the distribution of resources. Second, children will evaluate previous 
distributions to the receiver, a principle known as "direct reciprocity" (previously 
discussed). Finally, children will determine if the recipient has shown any positive 
distributive behavior toward third-party individuals, which is known as the previously 
discussed concept of indirect reciprocity. In more mature forms of moral reasoning with 
regard to equity distribution, considerations of the need and merit of distributed resources 
must be considered to determine if a distribution behavior is fair (McGillicuddy-DeLisi, 
Daly, & Neal, 2006; Shaw & Olsen, 2012; Meriosto  & Surian 2013; Meristo & Surian, 
2014).   
The consideration of need and merit requires more complex cognitive processing, 
due to the fact that evaluations of fairness are no longer based on surface characteristics 
of “more than” or “less than”, but require the individual making the evaluations to engage 
in second-order mental-state representations through the consideration of previous 
behaviors of the receiving and distributing agents. For this reason, there are relatively few 
studies of this nature that have been conducted using infant participants. However, recent 
work by Meristo and Surian (2013; 2014) has provided evidence that 10-month-old 
infants are capable of making social evaluations of fairness based on previous behaviors 
by the receiving individuals. Meristo and Surian (2013) used a paradigm in which two 
distributing agents treated two identical receivers either fairly, by distributing two 
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strawberries equally across the two receivers, or unfairly, by distributing both 
strawberries to one receiver and ignoring the remaining receiver. Following this phase, a 
new agent entered and acted prosocially by distributing strawberries to either the unfair 
or fair distributor. Longer looking time in this study indicated that the infants’ 
expectations of the event outcome had been violated. Infant looking times were 
significantly longer when the new agent acted prosocially toward the agent that had 
previously distributed an unequal number of strawberries compared to the agent that had 
distributed the resources equally between receivers. In other words, infants were 
considered to be positively evaluating the fair, prosocial distributor rather than the unfair, 
antisocial distributor and the distribution of resources did not match their expectations 
based on the previous antisocial actions of the receiver that was provided more resources. 
These findings are further supported by a recent study conducted by Surian and Franchin 
(2017). This study, conducted with 15- and 20-month-old infants, indicated that by 20 
months of age infants preferred to see agents of equal merit to receive equal distributions 
and children and agents of unequal merit to receive distributions proportional to their 
relative merit. The 15-month-old infants demonstrated a similar pattern of behavior, but 
the results were not statistically significant.  However, this indicates that by the second 
year of life infants may be taking merit and deservingness into account when making 
evaluations of fairness.  
In sum, as infants develop an understanding of possession and begin to engage in 
spontaneous sharing behaviors (Ziv & Sommerville, 2018), they also appear to develop 
an understanding of equitable resource distribution and establish a preference for these 
equitable distribution behaviors. These preferences and their subsequent behaviors of 
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prosocial sharing and fairness appear within the second half of the first year of life and 
continue to strengthen over the course of development (Merios & Surian, 2013). Once 
again in preference paradigms, looking time at the agent(s) is being evaluated, but in 
violation of expectation paradigms, looking time at the event outcome is evaluated. That 
said, contrasting results investigating the socio-moral competence of infants have been 
found across several studies following the violation of expectation paradigm. Longer 
looking times were recorded in events where the third-party agent approached the helper 
rather than the hinderer (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007), when resources were 
distributed unfairly between equal participants (Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012), 
and when unfair agents received rewards rather than fair agents (Meristo & Surian, 
2013).  However, longer looking times toward third-party agents that approached 
(Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003) or stood near (Geraci and Surian, 2011) the helper 
rather than the hinderer have also been recorded.  While there may be plausible 
explanations for these differences, the interpretation of longer looking times in more than 
one way within either the preference paradigms or the violation of expectation paradigms 
would lead to non-falsifiable hypotheses and therefore, non-scientific measures of 
preference or aversion. 
Overall, infants have been observed displaying differential responding toward 
equitable and inequitable resource distribution paradigms.  While various measures have 
been used in these paradigms, each has attempted to demonstrate that infants recognize 
differences in equitable and inequitable resource distribution and each has attempted to 
demonstrate that infants have an aversion toward inequitable distribution or a preference 
for equitable distribution.  While it can be theorized that infants are making these 
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complex social evaluations based on learned reactions from social interactions, namely 
cognitive and/or affective components of empathy, a greater understanding of infant 
responding in these paradigms is required to more fully understand why infants are 
indicating a preference for equitable distribution and an aversion toward inequitable 
distribution.  
Present Study 
Evidence supports that infants may have the emotional and cognitive capacity to 
interpret interactions between animate agents and evaluate these actions as either 
prosocial or antisocial behaviors. Furthermore, infants appear to use this information 
about the behaviors of others to make determinations as to whether to interact with these 
individuals in future situations in a prosocial or antisocial way. However, there is still a 
need to better understand the multi-directionality surrounding prosocial responding in 
order to further explore the developmental trends in the various forms of prosocial 
behaviors. Evolutionary adaptiveness, cognitive and social developmental theories, as 
well as neurobiological findings provide explanations as to infants’ abilities to engage in 
these other-oriented behaviors at an early age. Therefore, explanations of the emergence 
of these behaviors could be characterized as either an innate capacity to make conceptual 
representations of emotional and psychological states of others, or as being a motivation 
to share perceptions and emotions of others which could combine with gained social 
understanding to generate prosocial responses. These alternative theories are often 
singularly provided in an attempt to explain prosocial development, but they need not be 
mutually exclusive and a combination of these theories provides a more well-rounded 
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explanation as to the development of prosociality and the differences in the trajectory of 
the various forms that they are displayed in.  
After a thorough review of the literature to date it is clear that there are various 
gaps in this particular area of study. Research observing the development of prosocial 
tendencies, inequity aversion, and preference for resource equality has been conducted 
across a variety of age groups (Hamlin et al., 2007; Kuhlmeier, Wynn & Bloom, 2003; 
Scola et al.,2015; Hamlin & Wynn, 2011; Hamlin et al., 2011; Geraci & Surian, 2011; 
Shaw & Olsen, 2012). However, to our knowledge, all of the previous research has 
focused either on the responses of infants and toddlers toward the agent acting in a 
prosocial or antisocial manner, or has been based on the distributive or helping behaviors 
of infant participants.  While this research provides an understanding of early moral and 
social development and its effects on prosocial responding, little is known about infant 
evaluations of individuals on the receiving end of prosocial and antisocial behaviors by 
means of unequal resource distribution.  
Additionally, few studies observing reactions to prosocial and antisocial behaviors 
have included non-social entities as either active or passive agents to allow for a 
behavioral comparison of infant responding to anti-social events directed toward 
inanimate, non-social (lacking facial features) agents.  By comparing any behavioral 
differences that occur toward both social and non-social entities, we can gain a clearer 
understanding of the factors that are driving empathic and prosocial responses from 
infants.  
The purpose of the current study was to determine if infants in their second year 
of life prefer receiving individuals that have previously been treated prosocially by 
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another, or receivers that have been treated antisocially, thereby demonstrating an 
empathic emotional response to individuals that are victims of antisocial behaviors. This 
was achieved through the behavioral observation of infants that were exposed to a 
paradigm of prosocial and antisocial resource distribution. The resource distribution 
paradigm consisted of unequal distribution trials that used both animate and inanimate 
agents on the receiving end of either prosocial or antisocial resource distribution. With 
the aforementioned literature in mind, it was hypothesized that infants would demonstrate 
a greater preference for receiving agents that are provided with fewer resources compared 
to the alternate receiver due to an affective empathic response by the infant observer. 
Furthermore, it was hypothesized that when the receiving agents were inanimate the 
infant would show a greater preference for the agent that was distributed a greater 










Participants were 27 infants (9 males and 18 females) and their caregivers 
observed in the Developmental and Psychophysiology laboratory at Oklahoma State 
University. A two-tailed, a priori statistical power analysis was carried out (GPower 3.1) 
in order to estimate sample size.  This was based on data from studies that assessed infant 
preference for equitable resource distribution at 12 and 16 months of age (Geraci & 
Surian, 2013; Sommerville & Schmidt, 2012). These studies had effect sizes (ES) ranging 
from .25 to .56 (d) depending on the specific constructs being measured within each 
experiment, which are small to medium ES according to Cohen’s conventions (1988). 
With this in mind the average estimated sample size needed for the current study was 
approximately N = 23 for this within-group comparison. One infant did not complete all 
six trials and the procedure was aborted at the request of the caregiver due to excessive 
distress, and one infant’s responses were unable to be code due to equipment 
malfunction, so a final sample size of 25 infants was analyzed. All infants were full-term 
and healthy (8 caesarian sections and 17 natural births). Participants were assessed 
between the ages of 16 and 20 months (M = 79.68 weeks, SD = 4.96). Maternal ages 
ranged between 24 and 48 years (M = 34.35). Maternal ethnicity was reported with 80% 
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being Caucasian, 4% Asian, and 16% claiming multiple ethnicities. Paternal ethnicity 
was also reported with 68% being Caucasian, 12% African American, 4% Native 
American, 4% Asian, and 12% claiming multiple ethnicities. Sixty-eighty percent of the 
caregivers were married, 4% were separated, 8% were not married, 4% were divorced, 
and 12% were remarried. Reports of maternal education level indicated that 28% had 
completed post-graduate work, an additional 56% were college graduates, 8% had 
completed some college courses, 4% were votech graduates, and 4% had completed some 
vo-tech courses.  Reports of paternal education level indicated that 32% had completed 
post-graduate work, 24% were college graduates, 28% completed some college, 8% were 
vo-tech graduates, 4% completed some votech, and 4% had graduated high school. Just 
over half of caregivers (56%) had a monthly income over $4000, with 32% claiming to 
receive some form of state or federal financial assistance.  
Sample age justifications. The age of 18 months was chosen in response to the 
findings of similar studies in this area of research. In their study on the social evaluation 
capabilities of 3, 6, and 10-month-old infants Hamlin and colleagues (2007) found that 
10-month-old infants looked longer when the climber approached the hindering 
character, suggesting that the infants were surprised about this reaction, assuming that 
they expected the negatively-treated climber to show an aversion towards the character 
that had hindered it. Six-month-old infants demonstrated a different response and looked 
equally towards both events of approach to the helper and the hinderer, suggesting that 
even though they had preferred the helping to the hindering character, they did not 
attribute these attitudes to the protagonist as well. Therefore, infants may be 
developmentally capable of social evaluation prior to their ability to infer the evaluations 
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of others. In other words, due to increased cognitive complexity infants may not begin to 
attribute their own social evaluations to the affected third party (protagonist) until 
approximately 10 months of age. Additionally, Geraci and Surian (2011) examined the 
ability for 12 and 18-month-old infants to evaluate subtle moral dilemmas involving the 
inequity of resource distribution finding that only the older age group indicated a 
preference for the fair distributor. The combination of (a) the cognitive development 
required for the complex social evaluations required for the current study that were not 
found to occur until 10 months of age and (b) the previous findings of preference that did 
not occur until 18 months of age provide the rationale for the age chosen for the current 
study.  
Recruitment. Participants were recruited through the use of flyers distributed 
across the university campus, local childcare facilities, and other infant/caregiver 
organizations located in and around Stillwater, OK.  Social media advertisements 
describing the study were used in order to increase awareness. Participants of this study 
were treated in accordance with the regulations of the Institutional Review Board of 
Oklahoma State University (see Appendix F).  
Measures and Materials 
Demographic questionnaire. Primary caregivers were administered a 
demographic questionnaire in order to collect general information regarding the infants 
and the members of their immediate families. Information on income level, marital status, 
number of siblings, birth order, household language (i.e. monolingual vs. bilingual), and 
parental education level was gathered (see Appendix C).  
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Distribution display. All events in the distribution paradigm occurred in a 
custom wooden display (48” L X 34” H X 22” D) that emulated a “black box theatre” 
space (see Figures 1-6). Two receiving agents were placed on either side of the “stage” 
(20 in. apart). A stationary wooden peg was permanently situated in front of each of the 
receiving agents, which secured the distributed resources in place during the test phase of 
the procedure. A cut-out in the rear wall of the display allowed for the distributing agent 
to enter and distribute the resources to the receivers on either side of the stage.  The 
experimenter operating the distributing agent was hidden from the view of the 
participants by a black, floor-length dividing curtain.  Additionally, a small curtain 
covering only the front of the stage was raised during the test phase and lowered between 
each of the six test trials (discussed below) to prevent the infants from becoming 
distracted by changes taking place between trials). 
Agents. The animate distributing and receiving agents consisted of 7 different 
plush stuffed animals of various colors.  All were Ty brand to allow for consistency in the 
style across each of the 7 agents and the “hands” of the agents were sewn together to 
conceal the experimenter’s gloved hand. The inanimate receiving agents consisted of 6 
plush geometric shapes (7 x 7 in) of various colors. The size and fabric of the animate 
agents was taken into account when creating the inanimate agents to ensure as much 
consistency as possible between the two types of agents. An animate agent was still used 
as the distributor in the inanimate conditions, which explains the discrepancy between the 







 The study took place in a small, sound reducing room, while researchers 
conducted the distribution paradigm from an adjoining experimenter room. The room 
contained a stationary adult chair and the distribution display.   Upon arrival to the lab, 
primary caregivers were asked to complete the demographic questionnaire and then 
encouraged to engage in free play with their infant for approximately 10 minutes in order 
to acclimate the infant to the environment, decreasing distraction and anxiety during 
testing. At the conclusion of the acclimation phase, the caregiver was presented with a 
sample of the resource distributed to agents in the testing phase.  The caregiver was 
instructed, upon receiving the sample resource, to become excited, attempt to share the 
resource with their infant and try to elicit the same excitement in their infant to help 
establish that it is a desirable resource. The experimenter provided caregivers with short 
scripts to be used in order to maintain as much consistency as possible in the level of 
enthusiasm portrayed by the caregivers. Following the acclimation phase, the infant was 
seated on the caregiver’s lap facing the distribution display at which time they watched 6 
distribution trials (3 animate and 3 inanimate), each followed by a choice phase. The 
caregiver was instructed to remain neutral and not attempt to elicit a choice from the 
infant or influence the infant in any way. 
Distribution Phase 
 The test phase began when the curtain opened to reveal two agents positioned on 
either side of the display with empty wooden pegs in front of each of them.  A third agent 
emerged from the cut out in the back of the stage and distributed resources to the 
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receiving agents.  Using exaggerated movements, the distributor allocated the resources 
in a 5:1 distribution ratio. The resources were similar to the one provided to the caregiver 
during the acclimation phase, but included a variety of colors to stimulate attention of the 
infant and ensure that the infant could distinguish the resources as individual from one 
another from a distance. After the distributing agent dispersed all six resources to the 
receiving agents, it disappeared through the cut out in the back of the display and the 
experimenter closed the front curtain, hiding the receiving agents from view.  
Counterbalancing. To control for infant preference of color or animal type of the 
animate agents, each animate agent needed to be equally likely to be used as the 
distributing agent. This created a total of 7 possible conditions, which were randomized 
across the 25 participants. Under each condition the pairing of agents for each trial was 
randomized, creating as many unique combinations of agents as possible. Within each 
condition the order of the six trials was randomized to counterbalance the animate and 
inanimate trials. The position of the rich receiver and poor receiver was also randomized 
across trials to prevent habituation. Finally, the order in which the resources were 
distributed between agents was also counterbalanced.  Resources were distributed in 
groups of 1, 2, and 3. To reduce participant bias, each receiver was approached twice 
during each trial by the distributor, with the rich receiver getting resources distributed in 
groups of 2 or 3 and the poor receiver getting one resource and being approached a 
second time, but not awarded a resource.  
Choice Phase 
Following each of the six trials, a second experimenter, blind to whether the 
receiving agents were treated prosocially or antisocially, emerged from behind the curtain 
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and administered a forced choice procedure by presenting both of the receiving agents at 
an equal distance from the infant.  Experimenters were instructed to look directly at the 
infant and encourage the infant to choose between the two receivers by asking “which 
one do you like?” and “can you pick one?” Infants were prompted until they reached for 
one of the agents. If infants did not make a manual response for 2 minutes it was counted 
as “no choice”. Following the manual response, infants were allowed to play with their 
chosen receiving agent for a short period of time before moving on to the next 
distribution trial. Reaching and grasping behavior were measured to indicate preference 
toward the agents, but only when the behavior was preceded by a look toward that same 
agent. Coding for reaches differed for that of grasps in that the infant would have to take 
hold of the agent and remove it from the experimenter’s hand to be coded as a grasp and 
signify the end of the trial. Additionally, the total duration of infant looking toward each 
of the agents was recorded. Caregiver interference was also coded on a 3 point Likert 
scale as subtle movements or encouragements to choose from the caregiver may have 
introduced a bias (see Appendix D). These behavioral measures were video recorded 
using a GoPro camera and chest mount harness to be coded offline at a later time. Using a 
GoPro camera attached to the experimenter allowed for minor adjustments to be made to 
the angle of the camera view, ensuring that the camera was always pointed directly 
toward the infant regardless of infant movement and allowing for subtle eye movements 









The purpose of this study was exploratory in nature as research on the social 
evaluations of receiving agents has, to our knowledge, not yet been conducted. It was 
hypothesized that infants would look toward and reach for the animate receiver that was 
given fewer resources by the distributing agent significantly more than they would reach 
for and look toward the animate receiver that was given a greater number of resources by 
the distributing agent.  Additionally, it was hypothesized that these behaviors would be 
influenced when social context was removed from the distribution paradigm. More 
specifically, when animate social features were removed from the receiving agents, 
infants would reach for the inanimate receiver that was given a greater number of 
resources by the distributing agent significantly more than they would reach for or look 
toward the inanimate receiver that was given a smaller number of resources by the 
distributing agent. 
Observation Oriented Modeling (OOM; Grice, 2011; Grice et al., 2012) was used 
to analyze the data.  OOM allows for the comparison of the actual manual choices and 
looking times made by each infant during each trial with expected patterns of outcomes 
and these results were summarized using accuracy indices. Depending on the statistical 
test, traditional null hypothesis testing (NHST) relies on a variety of assumptions, such as 
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homogeneity and normality of population distributions, whereas OOM utilizes 
randomization tests that are free of such assumptions. Many of our agent preference 
measures violated these assumptions, but because OOM is similar to non-parametric 
methods, we were able to avoid the strict assumptions of NHST and focus attention on 
the manual choices and looking times for each agent by the individual infants in the 
study. An Ordinal Pattern Analysis (Grice et al., 2015) in OOM was used to test the 
predictions previously outlined. Specifically, the expected ordinal pattern analysis for 
manual reaching behavior and looking times in the animate agent condition was as 
follows: agent receiving fewer resources > agent receiving greater resources. The 
expected ordinal pattern analysis for manual reaching behavior in the inanimate agent 
condition was: agent receiving greater resources > agent receiving fewer resources. 
In addition to OOM, NHST was also used, where appropriate, to analyze the data. 
For this within-subjects design, dependent samples t-tests were conducted to determine if 
there were significant differences in agent preference toward the rich versus the poor 
receiver on measures of total number of looks per unit of time, total duration of looks per 
unit of time, and the total sum of grasps.  Due to the variability in trial times both 
between- and within-subjects, the total number of looks and duration of looks were scaled 
by dividing the scores from each trial by the number of seconds each trial lasted.  The 
sum of the three animate and inanimate trials was then used for analysis.  
OOM Findings 
Hypothesis 1 
 The primary purpose of the present study was to determine if infants would make 
social evaluations of animate receiving agents that had been distributed resources 
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unequally. More specifically, it was predicted that infants would indicate a preference for 
an agent that had received a smaller number of resources in the distribution paradigm 
compared to an agent that had received a larger number of resources.  
 With regard to the number of looks per unit of time toward the animate receivers 
of resources, the expected ordinal pattern for each infant was as follows: animate poor > 
animate rich. Results indicated that 14 of the 25 infants matched this pattern with respect 
to the number of looks toward animate agents. This frequency can be converted to a 
percentage (56.00%) which is referred to as the Percent Correctly Classified (PCC) in an 
Ordinal Pattern Analysis. A simple randomization test was then used to assign a 
probability statistic, referred to as the chance value (or c-value), to the PCC. Based on 
1000 random trials for number of looks per unit of time, the c-value was .14 indicating 
that a PCC of at least 56% was likely to occur by chance 14% of the time for the current 
data and expected ordinal pattern.  
 For the duration of looks per unit of time toward the animate receivers of 
resources, the overall ordinal pattern (animate poor > animate rich) was again examined 
and results indicated that 14 of the 25 infants (PCC = 56.00, c-value = .32) matched the 
expected pattern and looked more frequently toward the animate poor receiver compared 
to the animate rich receiver. Additionally, an ordinal pattern analysis (animate poor > 
animate rich) of the sum of grasps indicated that only 10 of 25 infants (PCC= 40.00, c-
value = .68) chose the animate poor receiver over the animate rich receiver. Two infants 
did not complete a grasp to either agent.  When the infants that did not make a manual 
choice were removed from the analysis 10 of 23 infants (PCC = 43.48, c-value = .65) 




 An identical set of Ordinal Pattern Analyses was conducted for the responses to 
the inanimate receiving agent. The expected ordinal pattern outcome for inanimate trials 
was as follows: inanimate rich > inanimate poor. With respect to the total number of 
looks per unit of time, results indicated that 16 of the 25 infants (PCC = 64.00, c-value = 
.02) matched the ordinal pattern and looked more frequently toward the inanimate rich 
receiver compared to the inanimate poor receiver, which was consistent with the original 
hypothesis for inanimate agent preference. Similarly, 13 of 25 infants (PCC = 52.00, c-
value = .41) yielded longer durations to the inanimate rich receiver compared to the 
inanimate poor receiver. However, similar to the manual choices in the animate trials, 
only 7 of 25 infants (PCC = 28.00, c-value = .81) completed grasps to the rich receiver 
compared to the poor receiver.  Three infants did not complete a grasp to either agent.  
When the infants that did not make a manual choice were removed from the analysis this 
ratio increased to 7 out of 22 (PCC = 31.82, c-value = .81) infants choosing completed 
grasps to the rich compared to the poor receiver (see Table 1). 
NHST Findings 
Hypothesis 1. 
 To determine if infants indicate a preference for an animate rich receiver that had 
received a greater number of resources in the distribution paradigm compared to an 
animate poor receiver that had received a smaller number of resources, paired samples t-
tests were conducted to analyze whether there were significant mean differences in total 
number of looks per unit of time, total duration of looks per unit of time, and sum of 
grasps toward the poor and rich receiver in the animate condition. Using Bonferroni 
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adjustment to protect against a type I error, a more conservative family-wise error rate of 
p < .025 was used (Hays, 1988). Results indicated that there was not a significant 
difference in the total number of looks toward the poor (M = .651, SD = .381) and rich (M 
= .531, SD = .269) receivers; t (23) = 1.706, p = .101. In keeping with these findings, 
there was also not a significant difference (t[22] = .741, p = .466) between the total 
duration of looks per unit of time toward the poor (M = .972, SD = .455) and rich 
receivers (M = .905, SD = .419), nor was there a significant difference (t[24] = .137, p = 
.892) in the sum of grasps toward the poor (M = 1.36 SD = 1.036) and rich receivers (M = 
1.32, SD = .988) (see Table 2).  
Hypothesis 2.  
An identical set of paired samples t-tests (using the same family-wise error rate of 
p < .025) was run for inanimate receiving agents which also indicated that there were no 
significant differences for total number of looks per unit of time (t [23] = -1.35, p = .190) 
toward the poor (M = .467, SD = .217) or rich (M = .530, SD = .283) receiver, no 
significant differences for total duration of looks per unit of time (t[24] = .398, p = .694) 
toward the poor (M = .820, SD = .543) or rich (M = .766, SD = .418) receiver, and no 
significant differences for sum of grasps (t[24] = 1.413, p = .170) toward the poor (M = 
1.52, SD = 1.09) or rich (M = 1.08, SD = 1.08) receiver (see Table 2).  
Exploratory Analyses. 
Financial Assistance.  Research by Paulus (2015) indicates that a lack of resources 
may be influential enough to overcome the negative behavior associated with unequal 
resource distribution.  In other words, a lack of resources in a community may increase 
the tendency to distribute unevenly in order to reduce the tendency of wasting valuable 
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resources. Additionally, it was found that in preschool children, low socioeconomic status 
increased the likelihood that children engaged in prosocial behavior compared to high 
socioeconomic status (( Gunote, Cotzia, Sandhu, & Siwa, 2017). With this in mind, in 
addition to testing our original hypotheses, exploratory analyses were conducted to 
determine if there were any preferential differences between the poor and rich receivers 
for children whose parents were not recipients of some level of government financial 
assistance and children whose parents were recipients of government financial assistance. 
A set of Ordinal Pattern Analyses was conducted for the responses to the animate 
receiving agent (see Table 3). The expected ordinal pattern outcome for both financial 
assistance and non-financial assistance was identical to that of the initial hypothesis: 
animate poor > animate rich. In the group that received financial assistance, 5 of 8 infants 
(PCC = 62.50, c-value = .21) looked more frequently toward the animate poor receiver 
compared to the animate rich receiver, 5 of 8 infants (PCC = 62.50, c-value = .35) looked 
longer to the animate poor receiver compared to the animate rich receiver, and 7 of 8 
infants (PCC = 87.50, c-value = .01) completed grasps to the poor receiver compared to 
the rich receiver.  In the group that did not receive financial assistance 9 of 17 (PCC = 
52.94, c-value = .31), looked more frequently toward the animate poor compared to the 
animate rich, 9 of 17 (PCC = 52.94, c-value = .51) looked longer to the animate poor 
compared to the animate rich, and only 3 of 17 (PCC = 17.65, c-value = .99) completed 
grasps to the poor receiver compared to the rich receiver.  
Ordinal Pattern Analyses were conducted for the responses to the inanimate 
receiving agent (see Table 4). The expected ordinal pattern outcome for both financial 
assistance and non-financial assistance was again identical that of the initial hypothesis: 
46 
 
inanimate rich > inanimate poor. In the group that received financial assistance, 2 of 8 
infants (PCC = 25.00, c-value = .77) looked more frequently toward the inanimate rich 
receiver compared to the inanimate poor receiver, 3 of 8 infants (PCC = 37.00, c-value = 
.72) looked longer to the inanimate rich receiver compared to the inanimate poor 
receiver, and 1 of 8 infants (PCC = 12.50, c-value = .97) completed grasps to the rich 
receiver compared to the poor receiver.  In the group that did not receive financial 
assistance 14 of 17 (PCC = 82.35, c-value = .002), looked more frequently toward the 
inanimate rich compared to the inanimate poor, 10 of 17 (PCC = 58.82, c-value = .29) 
looked longer to the inanimate rich compared to the inanimate poor, and only 6 of 17 
(PCC = 35.29, c-value = .58) completed grasps to the rich receiver compared to the poor 
receiver.  
In addition to OOM analyses, NHST was also analyzed using paired samples t-
tests. Again, to protect against a type I error, a family-wise error was maintained by using 
a significance level of p = .025 (Hays, 1988). These analyses indicated that there were no 
significant differences for total number of looks per unit of time, total duration of looks 
per unit of time and sum of grasps between the animate poor receiver and the animate 
rich receiver for children of parents who were not recipients of financial or government 
assistance (see Table 5). With regard to the results of these same analyses comparing the 
inanimate poor receiver and the inanimate rich receiver, analyses indicated that children 
of parents who were not recipients of financial or government assistance looked 
significantly more often per unit of time (t[16] = .-3.223, p = .005) toward the rich (M = 
.581, SD = .299) than the poor receiver (M = .449, SD = .209). Significant differences 
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were not found for duration or sum of grasps in the inanimate condition for the NO 
financial assistance group (see Table 5).  
 An identical set of paired t-tests was conducted for the group that did receive 
financial assistance.  With regard to total number of looks per unit of time and total 
duration of looks per unit of time in the animate trials, no significant differences were 
found, although duration of looks per unit of time was approaching significance (t[6] = 
2.670, p = .037) at p < . 025 (see Table 6).  In addition, there were significantly more 
grasps of the animate poor receiver (M = 2.00, SD = .926) than the animate rich receiver 
(M = .75, SD = .463) in this financial/government assistance group (t[7] = 3.989, p = 
.005). Finally, no significant differences were found in preference measure toward the 
inanimate receiver for the financial assistance group (see Table 6).  
Sibship.  Research by Ziv and Sommerville (2016) found that the presence of 
siblings led to increased looking behavior toward unfair and unequal outcomes in a 
violation of expectation paradigm. To determine if the presence or absence of siblings in 
the home had an effect on measures of agent preference, sets of ordinal pattern analyses 
were conducted (see Table 7). For the animate trials, the expected ordinal pattern 
outcome for both siblings and only children was identical to that of the initial hypothesis: 
animate poor > animate rich. In the group that had siblings, 5 of 13 infants (PCC = 38.46, 
c-value = .58) looked more frequently toward the animate poor receiver compared to the 
animate rich receiver, 9 of 13 infants (PCC = 69.23, c-value = .15) looked longer to the 
animate poor receiver compared to the animate rich receiver, and 7 of 13 infants (PCC = 
53.85, c-value = .52) completed grasps to the poor receiver compared to the rich receiver.  
In the group without siblings, 9 of 12 (PCC = 75.00, c-value = .08), looked more 
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frequently toward the animate poor compared to the animate rich, 5 of 12 (PCC = 41.67, 
c-value = .82) looked longer to the animate poor compared to the animate rich, and only 3 
of 12 (PCC = 25.00, c-value = .87) completed grasps to the poor receiver compared to the 
rich receiver.  
For the inanimate receiving trials, the expected ordinal pattern outcome for infants 
both with and without siblings was again identical that of the initial hypothesis: inanimate 
rich > inanimate poor (see Table 8). In the group that had siblings, 8 of 13 infants (PCC = 
61.54, c-value = .18) looked more frequently toward the inanimate rich receiver 
compared to the inanimate poor receiver, 6 of 13 infants (PCC = 46.15, c-value = .70) 
looked longer to the inanimate rich receiver compared to the inanimate poor receiver, and 
4 of 13 infants (PCC = 30.77, c-value = .88) completed grasps to the rich receiver 
compared to the poor receiver.  In the group without siblings, 8 of 12 (PCC = 66.67, c-
value = .06), looked more frequently toward the inanimate rich compared to the 
inanimate poor, 7 of 12 (PCC = 58.33, c-value = .25) looked longer to the inanimate rich 
compared to the inanimate poor, and only 3 of 12 (PCC = 25.00, c-value = .65) 
completed grasps to the rich receiver compared to the poor receiver.  
To analyze using NHST, sets of paired samples t-tests were conducted. Again, to 
protect against a type I error, a family-wise error was maintained by using a significance 
level of p = .025 (Hays, 1988). Regardless of group (siblings versus no siblings), there 
were no significant mean differences between the poor and rich receiver for any of the 
preference measures (see Tables 9 & 10). 
Gender Comparisons. It is widely accepted across psychological research that 
there are small, but distinct gender differences in emotional capabilities that, even in 
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infancy, favor females (Brody, 2000; Chaplin & Aldao, 2013). To determine if gender 
had an effect on measures of agent preference, sets of ordinal pattern analyses were 
conducted (see Table 11). For the animate trials, the expected ordinal pattern outcome for 
both males and females was identical to that of the initial hypothesis: animate poor > 
animate rich. Consistent with our hypothesized pattern, in the male group, 6 of 8 infants 
(PCC = 75.00, c-value = .14) looked more frequently toward the animate poor receiver 
compared to the animate rich receiver, but for duration of looks (PCC = 37.50, c-value = 
.86) and sum of grasps (PCC = 25.00, c-value = .83) a majority of infants did not follow 
the hypothesized pattern.  In the female group, 11 of 17 (PCC = 64.71, c-value = .17), 
looked for longer durations toward the animate poor compared to the animate rich, but 
only a minority of female infants looked more frequently (PCC = 47.06, c-value = .42) or 
completed grasps (PCC = 47.06, c-value = .59) to the poor receiver compared to the rich 
receiver.  
For the inanimate receiving trials, the expected ordinal pattern outcome for both 
male and female infants was again identical to that of the initial hypothesis: inanimate 
rich > inanimate poor (see Table 12). In the male group, 6 of 8 infants (PCC = 75.00, c-
value = .07) looked more frequently toward the inanimate rich receiver compared to the 
inanimate poor receiver, but this pattern once again did not extend to duration of looks 
(PCC = 50.00, c-value = .65) or completed grasps (PCC = 37.50, c-value = .65) to the 
rich receiver compared to the poor receiver.  In the female group, 10 of 17 (PCC = 58.82, 
c-value = .15), looked more frequently toward the inanimate rich compared to the 
inanimate poor and 9 of 17 (PCC = 52.94, c-value = .38) looked longer to the inanimate 
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rich compared to the inanimate poor, but only 4 of 17 (PCC = 23.53, c-value = .88) 
completed grasps to the rich receiver compared to the poor receiver.  
To analyze each gender’s responses using NHST, sets of paired samples t-tests 
were conducted. Again, to protect against a type I error, a family-wise error was 
maintained by using a significance level of p = .025 (Hays, 1988). Regardless of group 
(male versus female), there were no significant mean differences between the poor and 
rich receiver for any of the preference measures (see Tables 13 & 14). 
Age Comparisons. Infants make many advances in their second year of life and the 
ability to evaluate the effects of negative actions on passive receivers requires perspective 
taking, a process which some suggest does not emerge until 18 months of age 
(Thompson, 1987).  To determine if infants 18 months and older differed in their agent 
preference, sets of ordinal pattern analyses were conducted (see Table 15). For the 
animate trials, the expected ordinal pattern outcome for both ages was again identical to 
that of the initial hypothesis: animate poor > animate rich. In the infants 18 months and 
older, 9 of 16 infants (PCC = 56.25, c-value = .33) looked more frequently, and exactly 
half of the infants (8 of 16) looked longer (PCC = 50.00, c-value = .60) or completed 
grasps (PCC = 50.00, c-value = .39) to the poor receiver compared to the rich receiver.  
Infants younger than 18 months, 5 of 9 (PCC = 55.56, c-value = .23), looked more 
frequently and 6 of 9 (PCC = 66.67, c-value = .27) infants looked for longer durations, 
but only 2 of 9 (PCC = 22.22, c-value = .94) completed grasps toward the animate poor 
compared to the animate rich.  
For the inanimate receiving trials, the expected ordinal pattern outcome for both 
age groups of infants was again: inanimate rich > inanimate poor (see Table 16). In the 
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18 months and older group, fewer than half of the infants looked more frequently (PCC = 
43.75, c-value = .31), looked for longer durations (PCC = 25.00, c-value = .87) or 
completed grasps to the rich receiver compared to the poor receiver, which is inconsistent 
with the hypothesized pattern.  In the infants younger than 18 months of age, 8 of 9 (PCC 
= 89.89, c-value = .01) looked more frequently toward the inanimate rich compared to the 
inanimate poor and 7 of 9 (PCC = 77.78, c-value = .08) looked longer to the inanimate 
rich compared to the inanimate poor, but only 3 of 9 (PCC = 33.33, c-value = .66) 
completed grasps to the rich receiver compared to the poor receiver.  
To analyze using NHST, sets of paired samples t-tests were conducted. Again, to 
protect against a type I error, a family-wise error rate was maintained by using a 
significance level of p = .025 (Hays, 1988). Regardless of age, there were no significant 
mean differences between the poor and rich receiver for any of the preference measures 
(see Tables 17 & 18). 
Side Preferences. A study published while the present study was taking place 
indicated that infants may be exhibiting a side preference during the choice phase when 
social evaluations are being assessed (Nighbor, Kohn, Normand, & Schlinger, 2017). To 
assess whether or not infants were responding to a side preference as opposed to making 
a social evaluation, paired samples t-tests were conducted. There were no significant 
mean differences between the left and the right side when presenting infants with the 
agents (see Table 23).  
Condition Order. As previously mentioned, the trial orders in this study were 
counterbalanced to control for order effects and agent color preference. There were a total 
of seven different conditions of various trial orders that were randomly assigned to each 
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participant.  To assess the effectiveness of this randomization, the primary results from 
the various analyses above were examined for each infant. Specifically, a one-way 
repeated subjects ANOVA was conducted.  Results indicated that condition orders did 
not have an effect on any measures of agent preference (see Table 24).  This indicates 
that trial order was not responsible for differences (or lack thereof) in agent preference by 








Research observing the development of prosocial tendencies and preference for 
resource equality has been conducted across a variety of age groups (Hamlin et al., 2007; 
Kuhlmeier, Wynn & Bloom, 2003; Scola et al., 2015; Hamlin & Wynn, 2011; Hamlin et 
al., 2011; Geraci & Surian, 2011; Shaw & Olsen, 2012). However, to our knowledge, all 
of the previous research has focused either on the responses of infants and toddlers 
toward the agent acting in a prosocial or antisocial manner, or has been based on the 
distributive or helping behaviors of infant participants.  While this research provides an 
understanding of early moral and social development and its effects on prosocial 
responding, little is known about infant evaluations of individuals on the receiving end of 
prosocial and antisocial behaviors by means of unequal resource distribution. The 
purpose of the current study was to determine whether infants prefer receiving 
individuals that have previously been distributed a greater number of resources by 
another, or receivers that were distributed fewer resources by another. By observing how 
infants react to the receivers of unequal resource distribution, we can gain a better 
understanding of primitive empathic responding, providing a clearer picture of how early 
empathic behaviors develop, and allow researchers to draw parallels between primitive 




The purpose of Hypothesis 1 was to determine if infants showed a preference 
toward a poor recipient of resources compared to a rich recipient of resources, thereby 
supporting the contention that infants have the capacity to make social evaluations toward 
individuals that are treated unfairly and potentially responding empathically toward 
recipients of fewer resources. While previous research (Geraci & Surian, 2016) has found 
that infants of similar age to our participants engage in social evaluation toward an acting 
distributing agent, the present study focused on the social evaluation of passive receiving 
agents. In the animate trials, more infants were found to look more frequently and for 
longer durations toward the receiving agent that was distributed fewer resources, namely, 
the poor receiver. While these findings are consistent with our hypothesis, only a small 
majority (56.00%) of the infants followed our hypothesized pattern. Mean differences of 
number of looks and duration of looks between the poor and rich receivers were not 
significant when analyzed using NHST. When infants made a manual choice between the 
two receivers, (i.e., attempted to grasp), a greater number of infants either chose evenly 
between poor and rich receivers or chose the rich receiver more often and again, mean 
differences in manual choice of receivers were not significant. Though a majority of 
infants did follow the expected pattern with regard to the number (56.00%) and duration 
(56.00%) of looks, these numbers were just over half for both measures, which does not 
provide substantial evidence that infants are being motivated by social evaluation to 
choose one receiver over the other. Additionally, only a minority of infants (40.00%) 
made a manual choice toward the poor animate receiver, which is inconsistent with our 
hypothesized pattern. These findings suggest that while a small majority of infants may 
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be capable of socially evaluating a passive receiving agent, it may also be fundamentally 
different from their evaluations of an acting distributing agent as these findings were 
weak, relative to those previously discussed that provided a basis for this study. 
Alternatively, there could be components of our methodology that are influencing infant 
behaviors.   
Research indicates that when making social evaluations based on equity 
distributions, infants as young as 10 months of age take social contexts such as 
deservingness and merit into consideration (Meristo & Surian, 2013). Further, these 
expectations are found to increase across infancy as infants become capable of more 
complex cognitive processes (Surian & Franchin, 2017).  In the present study, the infants 
were not provided any information regarding the previous behaviors of the passive 
receiving agents.  It is plausible that the inconsistencies in preference measures are due to 
infants of this age attempting to determine merit of the receiving agents. As the 
distribution paradigm in the present study did not provide any social context that would 
allow for the appraisal of deservingness or merit, it is possible that the conflicting 
findings between looking behaviors and manual choice is being influenced by the lack of 
social context. Similarly, receiving agents remained static during the distribution 
paradigm, giving no indication that the receivers were “excited” by being recipients of a 
greater number of resources or were “disappointed” by being recipients of fewer 
resources. A lack of response by the receiving agents may have been interpreted by the 
infants as indifference toward the allocated resources, either toward the resources 
themselves, or toward the inequitable distribution. If this is the case, it cannot be 
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expected that infants would empathize with the poor agent, as empathy is a response to 
positive or negative emotions, but not neutral.  
 The lack of response by the receivers was a result of a direct methodological 
choice to reduce perceptual bias in response differences. In the hill climbing paradigm 
used by Hamlin and colleagues (2007), the protagonist ‘climber’ bounced after being 
helped up the hill by a ‘helping’ agent. The findings were robust, but were challenged by 
Scarf and colleagues (2012) when they demonstrated that the infants may not have been 
responding based on their social evaluations, but their perceptual biases of the bouncing 
agent. Specifically, infants chose the helping agent when the protagonist bounced after 
being helped up the hill, but chose the hindering agent when the protagonist bounced 
after being ‘pushed’ down the hill. When the protagonist bounced in both the helping and 
the hindering trials, the infants showed no significant differences in preference and chose 
both equally. Therefore, while the inclusion of an ‘emotional’ response by the receiving 
agents may have increased clarity of how these agents should feel in response to 
inequitable resource distribution, it may also have introduced a confounding perceptual 
bias.  
Hypothesis 2 
 The purpose of the second hypothesis was to determine if there were behavioral 
differences in preference toward the receiving agents when resources were distributed 
unevenly between two non-social entities, or inanimate receiving agents. Once again, 
previous research (Meristo, Strid, Surian, 2016) has evaluated differences in preference 
between animate and inanimate distributing agents, but the present study focuses on the 
differences in preference toward passive receiving agents. Consistent with our 
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hypothesis, a majority of infants (64.00%) looked more frequently toward the inanimate 
rich receiver compared to the inanimate poor receiver. More infants (52.00%) were also 
found to look for longer durations toward the rich versus the poor receiver, but similar to 
the animate trials, this number was just over half.  Finally, these preference behaviors did 
not extend to the manual choice measure, with a minority of infants (40.00%) choosing 
the rich over the poor receiver, and again there were not significant mean differences for 
any of the measures of agent preference when analyzed through NHST.  
 Based on basic evolutionary theory and natural selection (Darwin, 1965), humans 
are motivated to seek out the best possible source for resources that aid in survival and 
reproduction. Therefore, we hypothesized that in the absence of social entities (i.e. agents 
with animate facial features), infants would be more likely to demonstrate a preference 
toward the rich inanimate receiver, thereby indicating a preference for aligning with the 
best possible outcome for survival. Though a greater number of infants (56.00%) looked 
more frequently and longer at the rich receiving agent with more resources to potentially 
“share”, their grasps did not follow this same pattern. Previous research using inanimate 
receiving agents found that infants do not place similar expectations of equitable resource 
distribution on the distributing agent when allocating resources to inanimate agents and 
infants look equally between the fair and unfair distributor (Sloan et al., 2012).  This is 
further supported by Gredeback, et al. (2015) who found that neural responses in the 
p400 ERP, a component of the brain that has been previously linked to empathy and 
prosocial responding, only occurred when the agents in the paradigm were animate (i.e. 
had eyes), suggesting that when the social valence is removed from the paradigm, the 
action is no longer interpreted by the infant as being goal-related (see also appendix E, 
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section 5).  Again, Sloan et al. (2012) and those using similar paradigms are still making 
claims regarding infant evaluation between fair and unfair animate distributing agents 
that had distributed to inanimate objects.  Thus, they are still evaluating the social actor 
as being either prosocial or antisocial. In the present study, the distributing agent is still 
animate even in the inanimate trials, but the infants are only making social evaluations 
directed toward the passive receiving inanimate agents. In other words, the direction of 
their social evaluation in the present paradigm is toward inanimate objects, which differs 
from the previously conducted research. Non-significant differences in NHST results 
would indicate that in the absence of defining facial features that provide a social context, 
infants are not likely to indicate a preference.  However, a greater number of infants did 
look more frequently (64.00%) and longer (52.00%) at the inanimate agent with greater 
resources, which could be an indicator that infants do have an interest in a greater number 
of resources when issues of morality are minimized.  
Overall, the findings of this study were not as robust as those of previous studies 
using similar paradigms (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Hamlin & Wynn, 2011; Schmidt & 
Sommerville, 2011). Hamlin et al. (2007) found that infants preferred a prosocial helping 
agent over an antisocial hindering agent, but did not attribute their own attitudes to the 
protagonist that had been helped or hindered.  In other words, infants may be capable of 
evaluating the actions of others before there are capable of evaluating the effects of those 
actions on passive receivers, a process that requires perspective taking, which some 
suggest is emerging around 18 months of age (Thompson, 1987), the average age of our 
sample. If perspective taking is just emerging at this time, it would be reasonable to 
suggest that this cognitive skill may not be developed enough to attribute actions to 
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passive receivers that are either lacking facial features or lacking previous behavior that 
would provide a social context for the infant to take on the perspective of.  
Exploratory Findings 
 Financial Assistance. In addition to the proposed analyses, the data were 
explored to determine if socioeconomic status influenced the outcome of behaviors 
toward the rich versus the poor receivers in either the animate or the inanimate trials. 
Socioeconomic status was operationalized based on whether or not the parents were 
recipients of some form of government financial assistance. OOM analyses indicated 
that, in the animate trials, the presence or absence of financial assistance may be 
influencing infants’ social evaluations. Specifically, in the animate trials, a majority of 
the infants that were recipients of financial assistance looked more frequently (62.50%), 
for longer durations (62.50%), and manually chose (87.50%) the poor agent compared to 
the rich agent. However, just over half of the infants that do not receive financial 
assistance looked more frequently and for longer durations at the poor compared to the 
rich agent.  Further, a minority of the non-financial assistance infants actually chose the 
poor agent over the rich. Traditional NHST analyses provided some support for the OOM 
findings in that infants whose parents were recipients of financial assistance were 
significantly more likely to make a manual choice of the animate poor receiver compared 
to the animate rich receiver, which is in keeping with our hypothesis. In the inanimate 
trials this effect disappeared for infants on financial assistance with significantly fewer 
than half of the infants looking more frequently (25.00%), for longer durations (37.00%) 
and manually choosing (12.50%) the rich agent over the poor agent, which is inconsistent 
with our hypothesis.  However, the infants that did not receive financial assistance did fit 
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the originally hypothesized pattern with a majority of the infants looking more frequently 
(82.35%) and for longer durations (58.82%) at the rich agent versus the poor agents.  
However, inconsistent with our hypothesis, a minority (35.29%) of non-financial 
assistance infants actually made a manual choice of the rich agent compared to the poor 
agent. 
 One explanation of these findings is that humans, in general, prefer others who 
are similar to themselves and are more likely to engage in cooperative or prosocial 
actions toward similar others compared to dissimilar others. Further, humans often dislike 
or attempt to avoid individuals who do not appear to be similar. This is not only true for 
adults, but also holds true for preverbal infants as well (Mahajan & Wynn, 2011). Based 
on this theory, it is plausible that infants on financial assistance were indicating a 
preference for the poor receiver versus the rich receiver because the lack of resources 
indicated more of a similarity to themselves.  
 Alternatively, early forms of empathy may be responsible for infants from low 
socioeconomic households preferring receiving agents that are also lacking in resources. 
As discussed in the literature above, empathy encompasses both affective and cognitive 
components.  Thompson (1987) suggests the cognitive component of perspective taking, 
a key component to mature empathy, emerges at approximately 18 months of age, similar 
to the age of our sample. Based on the theories of empathy and prosocial responding in 
infancy, it is plausible to suggest that infants that have, compared to their peers, 
experienced unequal resource distribution due to low socioeconomic status in the home 
may be more capable of (1) taking on the perspective of the animate poor receiver, (2) 
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understanding how the receiver feels, (3) experiencing that feeling themselves, and (4) 
being motivated by their empathic response to engage with the poor animate receiver. 
 Sibship. Recent research by Ziv and Sommerville (2016) found that the presence 
of siblings led to increased looking behavior toward unfair and unequal outcomes in a 
violation of expectation paradigm. Descriptive statistics (see Table 22) regarding sibship 
indicated that families on financial assistance had an average of 1.5 children that lived in 
the home full time and .75 stepchildren or half-siblings that lived in the home part-time 
and these two variables were significantly related (see Table 26). In contrast, families not 
on financial assistance averaged .5 children that lived in the home full time and .29 
stepchildren or half-siblings that lived in the home part-time. Using NHST analyses there 
was not a significant effect of financial assistance on measures of preference when 
controlling for sibship, nor was there a significant effect of sibship on measures of 
preference when controlling for financial assistance (see Tables 19 & 20). With this in 
mind, it may be necessary to consider the influences of financial assistance and sibship 
separately, as opposed to cumulatively.  
 OOM analyses indicated that in the animate trials, infants with siblings showed 
preference for the poor receiver in two of the three preference measures.  Though only a 
slight majority (53.58%) made a manual choice of the poor receiver compared to the rich, 
a large majority (69.23%) looked at the poor receiver for a longer period of time.  Infants 
without siblings only showed a preference for the poor animate receiver in one of the 
three measures.  In the inanimate trials infants that had siblings preferred the rich receiver 
in one of three measures of preference, but infants without siblings showed a preference 
for the rich receiver in two of three measures, with a moderate to large majority looking 
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more frequently (66.67%) and for longer durations (58.33%) at the rich receiver. While 
there were no significant differences when analyzed using NHST, OOM results does 
provide evidence that the presence of siblings may be causing infants to prefer poor 
receivers more than the rich receivers regardless of whether the agent is animate or 
inanimate. Similarly, the absence of siblings may be influencing infants to prefer the rich 
receiver over the poor regardless of agent type.  
 The increased presence of siblings, stepsiblings, and half-siblings may require 
infants to engage in sharing and cooperative interactions and observe both fair and unfair 
resource allocation more frequently. This could promote expectations of fairness in these 
larger families, thereby influencing infant preferences toward the receiver allocated fewer 
resources. 
 Gender. Ordinal pattern analyses did indicate some gender differences with 
regard to looking behaviors.  Specifically, a majority of males looked more frequently 
(75.00%) at the animate poor compared to the rich, but a majority (64.71%) of females 
looked for longer durations toward the animate poor. However, both groups only had a 
minority (< 37.50%) of infants make a manual grasp toward the poor, animate agent. 
These results are not necessarily contradictory. Both males and females show a looking 
preference for the animate poor character, with the males looking more frequently and the 
females looking for longer durations. In the inanimate trials the male group still indicated 
a majority (75.00%) were looking more frequently toward the inanimate rich and in the 
female group a majority (58.82%) looked more frequently and a small majority (52.94%) 
looked for longer durations toward the inanimate rich, which is consistent with our 
hypothesized pattern. These differences in looking behaviors between males and females 
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may be contributing to a lack of robust findings for our original hypotheses when the 
group is not divided by gender.  
 Age. Inconsistent with our expectations, only a small majority (56.25%) of infants 
18 months and older looked more frequently toward the poor animate agent and this 
pattern did not extend to the other two preference measures. However, in the group 
younger than 18 months of age, a majority of infants looked more frequently (55.56%) 
and for longer durations (66.67%) toward the poor animate receiver compared to the rich. 
Similarly, in the inanimate trials, the older infants did not fit the expected pattern for any 
of the preference measures, but a large majority of the younger infants looked more 
frequently (88.89%) and for longer durations (77.78%) toward the inanimate rich 
compared to the inanimate poor.  
Implications 
To summarize, based on our findings it is plausible to suggest that infant’s social 
evaluations of a passive receiving agent differ from their evaluations of an acting 
distributing agent.  While they may be engaging in social evaluation toward both parties, 
the evidence of social evaluations toward agents making the choice to distribute evenly or 
unevenly is much stronger than the evidence provided by the current study that infants 
evaluate the passive recipients of unequal distribution. However, our findings suggest 
that socioeconomic status, number of siblings present in the home, gender, and age may 
have an effect on infants’ social evaluations of the passive agent.  Research focusing 
specifically on these exploratory findings should be conducted on a wider range of 
socioeconomic status.  
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 Previous research in this area has aided in informing much of what we already 
know about prosocial understanding, inequitable resource distribution, and empathic 
responses to these behaviors. However, in order to gain traction in this area of research 
and learn more about the developmental trajectories of the various forms of prosocial 
behaviors we must expand on the current research and supplement the field with new 
means for the identification of prosociality. Empathy and prosociality are core 
components to an effective social species, and an understanding of their development 
(both singularly and collaboratively) is crucial to having a well-rounded understanding of 
the socialization process of humans.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
One way that future research can help to clarify the outcome of this study is to 
provide an opportunity for infants to either distribute or reallocate resources between the 
rich and poor receivers. Hamlin et al. (2011) found that when given the option to either 
give or take a treat away from prosocial or anti-social agents, toddlers in the “give a 
treat” condition distributed treats more often to the prosocial rather than the anti-social 
agent.  Similarly, toddlers asked to “take a treat” removed the treat from the anti-social 
agent more often than they removed a treat from the prosocial agent. If infants are 
making social evaluations toward receivers similar to their evaluations of distributors, 
they would likely be inclined to reallocate resources evenly if given the opportunity, or to 
distribute additional resources to the poor receiver in an attempt to achieve fairness.   
As mentioned previously, neither the poor nor the rich agent responded upon 
receiving resources.  This was purposeful to prevent preference based on any perceptual 
biases that agent response may have elicited. However, modifying the paradigm to 
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include some indication that the receivers are happy or unhappy with their allotted 
resources may be necessary. If having the protagonist ‘bounce’ upon receiving help leads 
to preference of the agent nearest the bouncing protagonist as it was found to do in the 
study by Scarf and colleagues (2012), then it may be necessary to include a different 
indicator that the agents are interested in the resources.  Specifically providing a 
familiarization trial in which the agents interact with the resources and indicate 
excitement toward the resources, may be enough to solidify to the infants that receiving 
more resources would excite them and receiving fewer resources would disappoint them.  
Another modification that could be included in a future study would be the 
inclusion of a parental self-report on the sharing behaviors of their infants in other social 
situations.  Background information on the infants understanding of sharing and fairness 
would be beneficial and could provide some insight as to how their environment and their 
interactions with caregivers and peers influence their tendency to make social evaluations 
regarding unequal resource distribution.  
Finally, the sample size and the homogeneity of the participants for the current 
study may have resulted in a lack of significance in NHST analyses.  First, though the 
sample size was small, it was based on a G*Power analyses from the study by Geraci and 
Surian (2011), which provided the theoretical basis for this study and did find significant 
effects. However, as the social evaluation of the current study’s design may have been 
more complex than that of Geraci and Surian (2011) due to the agent in which the social 
evaluation was directed, a larger sample size may have been required to find an effect. 
Second, participants from the current study were recruited from a small city in the 
midwestern United States. This convenience sample, the size of which was further 
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reduced when grouped by either financial assistance or sibship, did not provide a 
significant level of variability in ethnicity, socioeconomic status, or education level of the 
caregivers. The significant differences in responding when comparing infants of parents 
that receive government assistance to infants of parents who do not should be further 
explored. Additionally, there was not a significant effect of sibship on measures of agent 
preference when controlling for financial assistance, nor was there a significant effect of 
financial assistance when controlling for sibship (see Tables 19 & 20), but families on 
financial assistance tended to have more children. Obtaining more information on the 
intertwining effects of number of siblings, age gap between siblings, and measures of 
socioeconomic status would be a beneficial contribution to this area of research. Further, 
cultural comparisons should be made with infants from less industrialized countries. The 
tendency for infants and toddlers to exhibit prosocial behaviors is a product of their 
environment and socialization experiences (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998). The observation 
of an alternative culture to determine if the responses found in the current sample are 
universal responses that can be found in societies that lack an abundance of resources 
would also be a positive contribution to this area of study.  
Conclusion 
 The purpose of the present study was to examine a gap in the existing literature on 
resource distribution and social evaluations in infants.  Due to the fact that this study was 
exploratory in nature we hypothesized that inequitable resource distribution toward 
passive animate receivers would elicit an empathically related response, motiving infants 
to choose to interact with the recipient of fewer resources.  Additionally, we hypothesized 
that in the absence of social context when empathic responses are irrelevant, that infants 
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would be motivated to interact with the recipient of greater resources in an attempt to 
align themselves with resources that may aide in their survival.  
 Overall, our findings were not as robust as previous research in this area, but did 
provide some support for the original hypothesis of infants exhibiting a preference for a 
poor animate receiver compared to a rich animate receiver, and for infants preferring a 
rich inanimate receiver. Measures of total number of looks, total duration of looks, and 
manual choice provided some mixed results, and when the expected ordinal pattern was 
met, it was often only met by a small majority of infants, and many of the mean 
differences in between the agents were not significant. 
 Exploratory analyses indicated that the socio-economic status (SES) of the family 
may have an effect on the infants’ responding. Specifically, low SES infants may be more 
motivated to choose the poor receiver over the rich receiver in the animate conditions, 
due to greater similarities and a preference for individuals that are “like them”. Further 
research with larger sample sizes and greater variability in SES would provide more 
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Ordinal Pattern Analysis for Measures Agent Preference for Animate and Inanimate Trials 
Ordinal Pattern Tested    
Measure n PCC c-value 
Animate: Poor > Rich 
 
   
Number of Looks (14)25 56.00 .14 
Duration of Looks (14)25 56.00 .32 
Sum of Grasps (10)25 40.00 .68 
Manual Choosers Only (10)23 43.48 .65 
Inanimate: Rich>Poor 
 
   
Number of Looks (16)25 64.00 .02 
Duration of Looks (13)25 52.00 .41 
Sum of Grasps (7)25 28.00 .81 
Manual Choosers Only (7)22 31.28 .81 
    
Note. Manual Choosers row is an additional Sum of Grasps analysis but includes only the 
participants that made a manual choice and includes only 22 infants; n indicates (number of 




Table 2  
Paired Samples t-tests for Measures of Agent Preference  
 Rich Poor     
Measure   M(SD) M(SD)   t df p d 
Animate 
 
      
Number of Looks   .531(.269)   .651(.381) 1.706 23 .101 -.321 
Duration of Looks   .905(.419) .972(.455) .741 22 .466 -.153 
Sum of Grasps 1.32(.988) 1.36(1.04) .137 24 .892 -.037 
Inanimate 
 
      
Number of Looks   .530(.283)   .467(.217) -1.35 23 .190 .250 
Duration of Looks   .766(.418)   .820(.543)   .398 24 .694 -.111 
Sum of Grasps 1.08(1.08) 1.52(1.09) 1.413 24 .170 -.406 
Note. Number of looks is the average number per unit of time (1 second); duration of looks is 
the average length of look per unit of time (1 second); sum of grasps is the sum across three 



















Ordinal Pattern Analysis for Measures of Animate Agent by Group – Financial Assistance 
Ordinal Pattern Tested – Poor > Rich    
Measure n PCC c-value 
No Financial Assistance    
Number of Looks (9)17 52.94 .31 
Duration of Looks (9)17 52.94 .51 
Sum of Grasps (3)17 17.65 .99 
Receive Financial Assistance    
Number of Looks (5)8 62.50 .21 
Duration of Looks (5)8 62.50 .35 
Sum of Grasps (7)8 87.50 .01 
Note.  indicates (number of infants correctly classified) with total number of cases 
Table 4 
Ordinal Pattern Analysis for Measures of Inanimate Agent by Group – Financial Assistance 
Ordinal Pattern Tested – Rich > Poor    
Measure n PCC c-value 
No Financial Assistance    
Number of Looks (14)17 82.35 .002 
Duration of Looks (10)17 58.82 .29 
Sum of Grasps (6)17 35.29 .58 
Receive Financial Assistance    
Number of Looks (2)8 25.00 .77 
Duration of Looks (3)8 37.00 .72 
Sum of Grasps (1)8 12.50 .97 
















Table 5  
Paired Samples t-tests for Measures of Agent Preference by Group No Financial Assistance  
 Rich Poor     
Measure   M(SD) M(SD)   t df p d 
Animate 
 
      
Number of Looks   .56(.29)   .67(.33) 1.374 15 .190 -.35 
Duration of Looks   .94(.44) .95(.47) .051 15 .960 -.02 
Sum of Grasps 1.59(1.06) 1.06(.97) -1.643 16 .120 .52 
Inanimate 
 
      
Number of Looks   .58(.30)   .45(.21) -3.223 16 .005 .50 
Duration of Looks   .80(.46)   .70(.40)   -.588 16 .565 .23 
Sum of Grasps 1.12(1.11) 1.35(1.06) .606 16 .553 -.21 
Note. Number of looks is the average number per unit of time (1 second); duration of looks is 
the average length of look per unit of time (1 second); sum of grasps is the sum across three 
animate trials and the sum across three inanimate trials; significant at the p < .025 level. 
 
Table 6  
Paired Samples t-tests for Measures of Agent Preference by Group Financial Assistance  
 Rich Poor     
Measure   M(SD) M(SD)   t df p d 
Animate 
 
      
Number of Looks   .47(.22)   .61(.49) .963 7 .368 -.37 
Duration of Looks   .82(.34) 1.03(.45) 2.670 6 .037 -.53 
Sum of Grasps .75(.46) 2.00(.93) 3.989 7 .005 -1.70 
Inanimate 
 
      
Number of Looks   .41(.21)   .51(.25) 1.022 6 .346 -.43 
Duration of Looks   .72(.24)   1.08(.72) 1.482 7 .182 .39 
Sum of Grasps 1.00(1.07) 1.88(1.15) 1.698 7 .133 -.79 
Note. Number of looks is the average number per unit of time (1 second); duration of looks is 
the average length of look per unit of time (1 second); sum of grasps is the sum across three 





















Ordinal Pattern Analysis for Measures of Animate Agent by Group – Sibship 
Ordinal Pattern Tested – Poor > Rich    
Measure n PCC c-value 
Only Child    
Number of Looks (9)12 75.00 .08 
Duration of Looks (5)12 41.67 .82 
Sum of Grasps (3)12 25.00 .87 
Siblings    
Number of Looks (5)13 38.46 .58 
Duration of Looks (9)13 69.23 .15 
Sum of Grasps (7)13 53.85 .52 
Note.  n indicates (number of infants correctly classified) with total number of cases 
Table 8 
Ordinal Pattern Analysis for Measures of Inanimate Agent by Group – Sibship 
Ordinal Pattern Tested – Rich > Poor    
Measure n PCC c-value 
Only Child    
Number of Looks (8)12 66.67 .06 
Duration of Looks (7)12 58.33 .25 
Sum of Grasps (3)12 25.00 .65 
Siblings    
Number of Looks (8)13 61.54 .18 
Duration of Looks (6)13 46.15 .70 
Sum of Grasps (4)13 30.77 .88 










Table 9  
Paired Samples t-tests for Measures of Agent Preference by Group Siblings  
 Rich Poor     
Measure   M(SD) M(SD)   t df p d 
Animate 
 
      
Number of Looks   .56(.19)   .64(.38) .761 11 .463 -.27 
Duration of Looks   1.01(.43) 1.10(.38) .887 11 .394 -.22 
Sum of Grasps 1.38(.77) 1.46(1.05) .163 12 .874 -.07 
Inanimate 
 
      
Number of Looks   .54(.21)   .50(.19) -.486 11 .637 .20 
Duration of Looks   .82(.30)   1.01(.53) 1.010 12 .332 -.44 
Sum of Grasps .92(.86) 1.77(.97.) 1.821 12 .094 -.93 
Note. Number of looks is the average number per unit of time (1 second); duration of looks is 
the average length of look per unit of time (1 second); sum of grasps is the sum across three 
animate trials and the sum across three inanimate trials; animate looks and duration is 
complete for only 12 participants due to outliers; inanimate looks is complete for only 12 
participants due to outliers; significant at the p < .025 level. 
 
Table 10  
Paired Samples t-tests for Measures of Agent Preference by Group Only Children  
 Rich Poor     
Measure   M(SD) M(SD)   t df p d 
Animate 
 
      
Number of Looks   .50(.34)   .67(.39) 1.615 11 .463 -.46 
Duration of Looks   .81(.41) .83(.50) .174 10 .394 -.04 
Sum of Grasps 1.25(1.23) 1.25(1.06) .001 11 1.00 .01 
Inanimate 
 
      
Number of Looks   .52(.35)   .43(.24) 1.615 11 .637 .01 
Duration of Looks   .70(.52)   .62(.50) .174 11 .332 .30 
Sum of Grasps 1.25(1.29) 1.25(1.22) .001 11 1.00 .01 
Note. Number of looks is the average number per unit of time (1 second); duration of looks is 
the average length of look per unit of time (1 second); sum of grasps is the sum across three 
animate trials and the sum across three inanimate trials; animate duration of looks is complete 





















Ordinal Pattern Analysis for Measures of Animate Agent by Group – Gender 
Ordinal Pattern Tested – Poor > Rich    
Measure n PCC c-value 
Males    
Number of Looks (6)8 75.00 .14 
Duration of Looks (3)8 37.50 .86 
Sum of Grasps (2)8 25.00 .83 
Females    
Number of Looks (8)17 47.06 .42 
Duration of Looks (11)17 64.71 .17 
Sum of Grasps (8)17 47.06 .59 
Note.  n indicates (number of infants correctly classified) with total number of cases 
Table 12 
Ordinal Pattern Analysis for Measures of Inanimate Agent by Group – Gender 
Ordinal Pattern Tested – Poor > Rich    
Measure n PCC c-value 
Males    
Number of Looks (6)8 75.00 .07 
Duration of Looks (4)8 50.00 .65 
Sum of Grasps (3)8 37.50 .65 
Females    
Number of Looks (10)17 58.82 .15 
Duration of Looks (9)17 52.94 .38 
Sum of Grasps (4)17 23.53 .88 













Table 13  
Paired Samples t-tests for Measures of Agent Preference by Group Males  
 Rich Poor     
Measure   M(SD) M(SD)   t df p d 
Animate 
 
      
Number of Looks   .49(.34)   .55(.35) 1.018 7 .343 -.17 
Duration of Looks   .78(.45) .80(.46)  .131 7 .899 -.04 
Sum of Grasps 1.13(1.13) .88(1.13) -.475 7 .649 .22 
Inanimate 
 
      
Number of Looks   .53(.35)   .44(.27) -1.415 7 .200 .29 
Duration of Looks   .72(.41)   .77(.65) .211 7 .839 -.09 
Sum of Grasps 1.00(1.07) 1.00(1.20) .001 7 1.00 .00 
Note. Number of looks is the average number per unit of time (1 second); duration of looks is 
the average length of look per unit of time (1 second); sum of grasps is the sum across three 
animate trials and the sum across three inanimate trials; significant at the p < .025 level. 
 
Table 14  
Paired Samples t-tests for Measures of Agent Preference by Group Females  
 Rich Poor     
Measure   M(SD) M(SD)   t df p d 
Animate 
 
      
Number of Looks   .60(.31) .71(.38)   .992 16 .336 -.32 
Duration of Looks   1.02(.57) 1.21(.59) 1.206 16 .245 -.33 
Sum of Grasps 1.41(.94) 1.59(.94)   .496 16 .627 -.19 
Inanimate 
 
      
Number of Looks   .54(.25)   .51(.23) - .521 16 .609 .12 
Duration of Looks   .79(.43)   .85(.50)   .329 16 .747 -.13 
Sum of Grasps 1.12(1.11) 1.76(.97) 1.833 16 .085 -.61 
Note. Number of looks is the average number per unit of time (1 second); duration of looks is 
the average length of look per unit of time (1 second); sum of grasps is the sum across three 





















Ordinal Pattern Analysis for Measures of Animate Agent by Group – Age 
Ordinal Pattern Tested – Poor > Rich    
Measure n PCC c-value 
18 months +    
Number of Looks (9)16 56.25 .33 
Duration of Looks (8)16 50.00 .60 
Sum of Grasps (8)16 50.00 .39 
< 18 months    
Number of Looks (5)9 55.56 .23 
Duration of Looks (6)9 66.67 .27 
Sum of Grasps (2)9 22.22 .94 
Note.  n indicates (number of infants correctly classified) with total number of cases 
Table 16 
Ordinal Pattern Analysis for Measures of Inanimate Agent by Group – Age 
Ordinal Pattern Tested – Poor > Rich    
Measure n PCC c-value 
18 months +    
Number of Looks (7)16 43.75 .31 
Duration of Looks (6)16 37.50 .86 
Sum of Grasps (4)16 25.00 .87 
< 18 months    
Number of Looks (8)9 88.89 .01 
Duration of Looks (7)9 77.78 .08 
Sum of Grasps (3)9 33.33 .66 













Table 17  
Paired Samples t-tests for Measures of Agent Preference by Group 18+ months  
 Rich Poor     
Measure   M(SD) M(SD)   t df p d 
Animate 
 
      
Number of Looks   .63(.36)   .73(.39) .905 15 .374 -.27 
Duration of Looks   .97(.58) 1.14(.62) 1.038 15 .316 -.28 
Sum of Grasps 1.38(1.09) 1.63(.96) .637 15 .543 -.24 
Inanimate 
 
      
Number of Looks   .55(.30)   .54(.26) -.201 15 .843 .04 
Duration of Looks   .74(.41)   .88(.59) .758 15 .460 -.28 
Sum of Grasps 1.25(1.13) 1.69(1.08) 1.100 15 .289 -.40 
Note. Number of looks is the average number per unit of time (1 second); duration of looks is 
the average length of look per unit of time (1 second); sum of grasps is the sum across three 
animate trials and the sum across three inanimate trials; significant at the p < .025 level. 
 
Table 18  
Paired Samples t-tests for Measures of Agent Preference by Group < 18 months  
 Rich Poor     
Measure   M(SD) M(SD)   t df p d 
Animate 
 
      
Number of Looks   .45(.19)   .53(.32) .969 8 .361 -.30 
Duration of Looks   .90(.49) .98(.51) .532 8 .609 -.16 
Sum of Grasps 1.22(.83) .89(1.05) -.816 8 .438 .35 
Inanimate 
 
      
Number of Looks   .52(.26)   .40(.18) -1.961 8 .086 .54 
Duration of Looks   .81(.46)   .71(.45) -.464 8 .655 .45 
Sum of Grasps .78(.97) 1.22(1.09) .839 8 .426 -.43 
Note. Number of looks is the average number per unit of time (1 second); duration of looks is 
the average length of look per unit of time (1 second); sum of grasps is the sum across three 





Predictive power of SibShip when controlling for Financial Assistance 
      
Measure R2 R2 change β t p 
Animate      
Number of Looks Rich .000 -.045 .163 .638 .531 
Duration of Looks Rich .013 -.031 .210 .926 .365 
Sum of Grasps Rich .001 -.043 .214 .955 .350 
      
Number of Looks Poor .010 -.033 .161 .661 .515 
Duration of Looks Poor .039 -.007 .242 1.036 .313 
Sum of Grasps Poor 
 
.042 .000 .087 .368 .717 
Inanimate      
Number of Looks Rich .005 -.038 .256 1.101 .283 
Duration of Looks Rich .031 -.011 .266 1.110 .279 
Sum of Grasps Rich .042 .001 -.215 -.893 .381 
Number of Looks Poor .097 .056 .312 1.393 .178 
Duration of Looks Poor .231 .197 .513 2.378 .027 
Sum of Grasps Poor .084 .045 .348 1.485 .152 
 
Table 20 
Predictive power of Financial Assistance when controlling for SibShip 
      
Measure R2 R2 change β t p 
Animate      
Number of Looks Rich .028 -.016 -.256 -1.006 .326 
Duration of Looks Rich .030 -.014 -.252 -1.107 .281 
Sum of Grasps Rich .142 .104 -.483 -2.161 .042 
      
Number of Looks Poor .002 -.042 -.122 -.501 .621 
Duration of Looks Poor .001 -.046 -.124 -.533 .600 
Sum of Grasps Poor 
 
.078 .038 .236 1.00 .328 
Inanimate      
Number of Looks Rich .005 -.038 -.365 1.101 .283 
Duration of Looks Rich .002 -.041 -.179 -.745 .464 
Sum of Grasps Rich .008 -.035 .019 .079 .938 
Number of Looks Poor .014 -.031 -.001 -.003 .998 
Duration of Looks Poor .037 -.005 -.065 -.301 .767 





Correlation of Financial Assistance and Sibship 
Variables Financial Assistance SibShip  
Financial Assistance -- .423*  




















Descriptive Statistics of Sibship and Financial Assistance 
  Siblings 
Measure   N M (SD) 
No Financial Assistance 17 .53 (.72) 
Financial Assistance  8 1.50 (.89) 
Note. All values represent raw, unstandardized scores.  
 
Table 23 
Paired Samples t-tests for Side Preferences 
 Left Right    
Measure   M(SD) M(SD)   t df p 
Animate 
 
     
Number of Looks   1.09(.530)   1.25(.802) -1.248 24 .224 
Duration of Looks   1.66(.849) 1.87(1.09) -.809 24 .427 
Sum of Grasps 2.68(2.10) 2.60(1.96) .133 24 .895 
  
Table 24 
Descriptive Statistics of Condition Order for Animate Agents 
  Number of Looks Duration of Looks Sum of Grasp 
  Rich Poor Rich Poor Rich Poor 
Measure   N M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Condition 1 4 .67 (.52) .53 (.27) .73 (.33) .68 (.36) 1.25 (.96) .75 (.96) 
Condition 2  3 .37 (.22) .42 (.46) .70 (.40) .91 (.60) .67 (.58) 1.33 (1.16) 
Condition 3  2 .15 (.06) .65 (.63) .55 (.40) 1.23 (1.47) 1.00 (1.41) 2.00 (1.41) 
Condition 4  3 .70 (.15) 1.07 (.45) 1.59 (1.03) 1.61 (.71) 1.00 (1.00) 1.33 (.58) 
Condition 5  2 .64 (.20) .95 (.43) .96 (.05) 1.22 (.58) 2.50 (.71) .50 (.71) 
Condition 6  6 .49 (.30) .51 (.29) .77 (.31) 1.07 (.47) 1.3 (.82) 1.33 (1.03) 
Condition 7 5 .75 (.21) .73 (.25) 1.25 (.51) 1.09 (.40) 1.80 (1.10) 1.80 (1.10) 




Demographic Information Questionnaire 
 
Child Information 
What is your relationship to the baby?  Example: mother, father, stepmother. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Gender of baby  _____ Male _____ Female 
Birth date of baby  ______________________ 
      Month      Day     Year 
Birth weight of baby   ___ lbs ___oz 
Date of expected birth (due date) ______________________ 
      Month      Day     Year 
Was the baby born by c-section?   YES  NO 
Maternal Information 
 
Birth date ______________________ 
   Month      Day     Year 
Your marital status (check one) 
 ___ Married, first time     ___ Single, never 
married 
 ___ Single, separated     ___ Single, divorced 
 ___ Single, widowed     ___ Remarried 
 ___ Other, please specify: ____________ 
Your own ethnic group (please check) _ 
__  Native American     Nation: __________ 
___  African American 
___  Hispanic 
___  Asian 
__  White 
__  Multiethnic      Describe:_______________ 
___  _Other 
Please place a check mark next to the highest grade you completed in school. 
 ____ 6th grade     ____ 11th grade 
 ____ 7th grade     ____ 12th grade 
____ 8th grade     ____ some vo-tech 
____ 9th grade     ____ some college courses 
____ 10th grade     ____ vo-tech graduate 
      ____ college graduate 
  ____ post-graduate work 
Please place a check mark next to the highest grade your spouse/partner completed in school. 
 ____ 6th grade     ____ 11th grade 
 ____ 7th grade     ____ 12th grade 
____ 8th grade     ____ some vo-tech 
____ 9th grade     ____ some college courses 
  
____ 10th grade     ____ vo-tech graduate 
      ____ college graduate 
 ____ post-graduate work 
Your current household income per month before taxes (please check one) 
  ___ $       0 - 100    ___ $ 2000 - 2499 
  ___ $   100 - 499    ___ $ 2500 - 2999 
  ___ $   500 - 999    ___ $ 3000 - 3499 
  ___ $  1000 - 1499    ___ $ 3500 - 3999 
  ___ $  1500 - 1999    ___ $ 4000 plus 
Is your current spouse/partner the father of the baby (check one) 
___ yes   ___ no 
Ethnic group of the biological father of the baby. (please check) 
___  Native American   Nation: __________________ 
___  African American 
___  Hispanic 
___  Asian 
___  White 
___  Multiethnic   Describe: __________________ 
___  Other 
Do you currently receive state or federal financial assistance? (check as many as apply)  
 ___ WIC      ___ Unemployment benefits 
 ___ TANF      ___ Energy assistance 
 ___ School lunch/breakfast    ___ Social Security/SSI 
 ___ Food Stamps     ___ Medicaid 
 ___ Indian Health Services 
For how many years have you received such assistance? (check one) 
 ___ five or more years 
 ___ four years 
 ___ three years 
 ___ two years 
 ___ one year 
 ___ less than one year 
My child seems to be less healthy than other children I know. 
 ____ strongly agree 
 ____ agree 
 ____ do not agree or disagree 
 ____ disagree 
 ____ strongly disagree 
My child has never been seriously ill. 
 ____ agree 
 ____ disagree 
Is English the primary language of the household? 
____ yes 
____ no 




If yes, what other languages are spoken in your household on a regular basis? 
 
Number of siblings living in the same household (excluding your participating infant). 
 
List the ages of all of the children living in your household. 
 





RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION CODING MANUAL 
10.5.17 
● The focus of coding will be reaching preceded by a look, i.e., any discernible reach in 
the direction toward an agent, most notably if they touch or grasp the agent, however, 
looking behaviors and other “agent directed” movements will also be recorded.  
● Each individual video will vary minutes in length, but will only be coded during the 
time in which the experimenter is kneeling in front of the infant with the agents in the 
corner of the frame for a total of 6 coding sessions.  
● Only code when there is AT LEAST part of each agent present in the frame.  
● Variables to be coded:  
➢  Baseline state:  The child's state prior to the beginning of a trial (measure 
baseline state during “resource introduction period”):  
o 1= tired/drowsy.  
o 2= alert/calm.  
o 3= alert/active. (engages with the resource) 
o 4= fussy.  
o 5= crying.  
➢ Agent Preference: each of the following variables should be coded for both the 
right (Roger) and left (Lucy) agents (right and left are from the experimenter’s 
point of view) 
▪ Note: code one trial at a time; watch the entire trial through before 
going back and recording specific times 
o Latency to first look toward the agents. 
o Latency to first reach toward the agents.  
o Latency to first touch of an agent 
o Latency to first look AND reach toward the agent 
o Total duration of look prior to reach. 
o Did they grasp the agent (take from experimenter)?  
  
➢ Parent behavior: Coded within each of the 6 trials. Interference could be touching, 
holding hand, attempts to focus the infant’s attention on the stimulus, or 
encouraging the infant to reach. 
o  0= Not interfering; neutral.  
o 1= Mild interference; verbal encouragement for choice or attention 
o 2= Interfering; generally disrupting.; (e.g. holding infant hands, physical 
encouragement toward agent, touching of agent 
Agent Key:  
A1 = Cream cat 
A2 = purple lamb 
A3 = Green rabbit 
A4 = brown dog 
A5 = (light) blue elephant 
A6 = (light) purple hippo 
A7 = yellow raccoon 
B1 = orange hexagon 
B2 = purple octagon 
B3 = green circle 
B4 = yellow triangle 
B5 = blue trapezoid 







Section  1. Moral Development and Prosocial behavior. Theories of moral development 
provide possible explanations as to why prosociality tends to increase with age. Piaget 
(1932) suggested that as children demonstrate advances in general cognitive 
development, their propensity for making moral judgments also begins to develop, with 
the basis of moral judgment shifting from a hedonistic position to a position that puts a 
greater emphasis on social approval. Prior to more advanced cognitive functioning in 
children, they engage in a stage of moral development that Piaget termed moral realism.  
During this time, the child complies with rules and regulations that have been outlined by 
an external authority figure, judging how moral or immoral an act may be solely on the 
basis of the consequences that the behavior evokes. Therefore, during this stage, children 
engage in prosocial behaviors when they perceive the behavior as a requirement enforced 
by their authority figure (usually a primary caregiver).  
 As children develop more advanced cognitive skills, their egocentric 
tendencies diminish, allowing for an ability to better empathize with other individuals 
(Decety & Jackson, 2004; Thompson, 1987), which has been positively linked to 
prosocial tendencies. With this cognitive increase comes the second stage of Piaget’s 
proposed moral developmental trajectory, autonomous morality. In this stage, children 
begin to understand that the rules and regulations previously set forth by their authority
figures are formed through negotiation.  Children learn that rules can be context 
dependent, that they may have more than one correct answer, and therefore can be 
changed accordingly.  In other words, there is a shift from an emphasis on equality, 
  
where all good and bad actions should receive the same rewards or consequences 
accordingly, to an emphasis on equity, where good and bad actions should be rewarded or 
punished based on consideration of the circumstances surrounding the behavior. 
Section  2. Psychodynamic theory of prosociality. The primary focus of Freud’s 
psychodynamic theory highlights the underlying impact of sexual and aggressive drives 
directed specifically toward achieving self-gratification by means of satisfying the “id”. 
As children age, they begin to develop a conscience, or “superego”, between the ages of 4 
and 6 years. This conscience is responsible for controlling the automatic impulses of the 
id, therefore creating a conflict between an individual’s desires and his/her fear of social 
discord. In other words, the superego mediates an individual’s underlying social urges 
(namely sex and aggression) with regulations set forth by society.  The superego is driven 
by the principle of morality (also known as the “idealistic principle”), and Freud 
suggested that when this develops, prosocial behaviors may appear as a means of 
reducing guilt inflicted by the conscience (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006). 
Variations of psychoanalytic theories (Fenichel, 1945; Glover, 1968) have also suggested 
that altruism and prosocial tendencies are driven by guilt, self-destructive tendencies, as 
well as sexual and aggressive urges, and that these prosocial behaviors are a defense 
mechanism employed by the ego to placate the id’s irrational demands. 
Section 3. Infant imitation preferences. In addition to understanding what infants are 
learning through the imitation of their models, it is important to consider whom infants 
are learning from as well. Some of the individuals that we interact with are positive 
influences and worthy models of imitation as they have an appropriate understanding of 
cultural practices and positive intentions. However, not all individuals should be imitated 
  
by infants and young children seeking a greater understanding of their surrounding world. 
The most adaptive mechanism that can accompany learning through imitation is the 
ability to discriminate the value of information being provided by outside sources and 
distinguish models that are providing accurate, objectively true information from those 
that are not. It has been found that pre-school children are sensitive to models providing 
false information and have been shown to not only identify, but in some cases correct, the 
false statements of others (Koenig & Harris, 2005; Pea, 1982).  Importantly, the 
assessment of the knowledge of the source of information will determine how infants use 
the information they receive from that source. Koenig and Woodward (2010) found that 
16-month-old infants are less likely to learn a new word from an individual who 
previously labeled objects inaccurately.  Similar research was conducted on just-verbal 
infants of 14-months of age, and it was found that even at this age, infants will not imitate 
the actions of an individual that had previously modeled unreliable behavior (Chow, 
Poulin-Dubois, & Lewis, 2008; Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum 2010).  While 
accuracy is seemingly the most adaptive and efficient way to determine which models to 
learn from and which to discredit, the past accuracy of others is not always available. 
Therefore, an understanding of a source’s potential accuracy would be the next best 
strategy to implement in a learning situation, without previous information about the 
model. 
In addition to the determining the accuracy of the individual, it is also necessary 
to evaluate how relevant certain information is to the learner.  Tool use, language, and 
food sources differ across cultures and much of the information relevant to one culture, 
may not pertain to the next.  It is therefore necessary to distinguish models of culturally 
  
relevant information from models demonstrating knowledge and actions better suited to 
other groups and cultures. This can be difficult to discern, especially for young infants 
and toddlers that benefit most from this information to further their understanding of 
social and societal norms. Therefore, sources that are similar to the learner and share a 
similar social group are likely to be more reliable models of behavior. 
 It was previously mentioned that, in the broader sense, infants prefer to learn 
from individuals that are “like them” and have demonstrated similarity in their actions 
(Goswami, 2011; Hamlin & Wynn, 2012; Mahajan & Wynn, 2012; Meltzoff, 1999).  
This similarity preference can also refer to a shared native language (Kinzler et al., 2009), 
chronological age or cohort (Ryalls, Ryalls, & Gijl, n.d.), and overall familiarity to the 
individual (Corriveau & Harris, 2009). Preference for general familiarity is clearly 
demonstrated in infant’s social referencing of the primary caregiver as infants in the first 
year of life will begin to examine the emotional expressions of their mothers and use that 
information to make decisions on how to respond emotionally in a given situation 
(Hutman & Dapretto, 2009). However, another important variable is not just whether the 
source is “like them”, but whether the source is liked at all.  
In a recent study, Hamlin and Wynn (2012) demonstrated a link between social 
evaluations of others and the likelihood that infants would gain and later implement the 
information provided by those social sources. A paradigm of a previous study conducted 
by Hamlin and colleagues (Hamlin & Wynn, 2011; Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, & Majana, 
2011; discussed below), was used, during which agents (potential information sources) 
acted prosocially or antisocially depending on the condition. Sixteen-month-old infants 
were given the choice between a food type that an acting agent had displayed a 
  
preference for and a food type they had not, and the extent to which infants chose a food 
that matched or differed from the agent was observed. Infants in the prosocial source 
condition chose the food for which the agent demonstrated a preference significantly 
more than the food for which the agent demonstrated distaste.  Infants in the antisocial 
source condition chose liked and disliked food an equal number of times, suggesting that 
they did not take into account the preference of the anti-social individual when choosing 
their food preference. Taken together, these results suggest that the positive evaluation of 
another will increase the likelihood that infants will learn from an individual and negative 
evaluations of another may result in the infant choosing to ignore the information being 
provided by the source, leading them to respond based on other relevant variables. 
Finally, as demonstrated in the novel source condition, in which the agent was unfamiliar 
to the infant having not been previously present in the paradigm, the lack of opportunity 
to evaluate the source prior to them providing information may also increase the 
likelihood that they will find the information relevant and respond accordingly, in this 
case by choosing the food type that the Novel Source demonstrated preference for 
significantly more than the alternative food type. 
Section 4. Evolutionary theories of prosociality. Nowak (2006) proposed possible 
mechanisms that may have contributed to the establishment of a truly prosocial species, 
including kin selection, direct, and indirect reciprocity. Kin selection theory, a mid-level 
theory proposed by Hamilton (1964), states that individuals that are genetically related 
will favor the reproductive success and continuation of the genetic line, often at the cost 
of the individuals own reproductive success (Hamilton, 1964; Nowak, 2006).  This 
evolutionary drive often termed kin altruism came to be known as“Hamilton’sHamilton’s 
  
Rule”. However, reproductive success is still an underlying goal for the acting individual 
and should he/she help a genetically related individual to succeed in that goal, thereby 
continuing his/her own genetic line. However, both individuals are benefiting in some 
way, which does not support the definition of prosociality most often used (Schmidt & 
Sommerville, 2011) and does not explain the cooperative behaviors frequently observed 
among non-related individuals.  
 Direct reciprocity is a strategy of mutual cooperation that takes place between two 
individuals that are not genetically related during a single exchange (Trivers, 1971). This 
behavior can be demonstrated in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The framework of the 
repeated Prisoner's Dilemma is based on the choices of cooperation or defection between 
two acting individuals, and it highlights the idea that one individual will help another at 
his/her own cost now, keeping in mind that this may lead to a returned benefit from the 
current receiver at a later time. In other words, helping behaviors directed toward social 
group members that are not genetically related increase the likelihood that assistance by 
those members will be provided in the future, which in turn would increase the chance of 
overall survival of the genetic line. This is supported by computational modeling methods 
that have demonstrated that social groups with a tendency to act prosocially are found to 
have greater population growth compared to groups that lack a genetic basis for prosocial 
responding (Sober & Wilson, 1998). However, this outcome relies on an agreement by 
both individuals that the other will return the prosocial action in the future. Direct 
reciprocity only facilitates prosociality if the cost-to-benefit ratio of the initial prosocial 
action is exceeded by the probability that a second encounter will occur between the two 
individuals (Nowak, 2006; Trivers, 1971). Often, however, additional encounters may not 
  
occur between two individuals, in which case, the occurrence of prosociality must be 
accounted for by an alternative mechanism.  
 While direct reciprocity can account for prosocial behaviors with non-genetically 
related individuals, two individuals must repeatedly engage with one another socially in 
order for it to be a strong enough mechanism to support continuous prosocial actions 
across the lifespan. Additionally, direct reciprocity relies on the likelihood that both 
individuals will be capable of providing help upon each future encounter. Indirect 
reciprocity on the other hand involves a reciprocal act of cooperation or prosociality from 
a third party that was not involved in the initial interaction. Schematically speaking, 
individual A acts prosocially towards individual B, which is observed by individual C, 
improving the reputation of individual A and promoting the likelihood that individual C 
will act prosocially toward individual A (Meristo & Surian, 2013; Nowak, 2006). 
Therefore, it is the social reputation that an individual builds that supports the evolution 
of cooperative and prosocial behavior. Primitive examples of indirect reciprocity can be 
seen in various strategies of natural selection and social hierarchies (Bshary & Grutter, 
2006). Howeverhowever, humans require advanced cognitive capabilities in order for this 
to occur.  First, they must remember not only their own actions, but also observe and 
remember the actions of other individuals around them. Second, language is required for 
the spread of information regarding the actions of other individuals (i.e. their reputation). 
Therefore, it was originally thought that indirect reciprocity could not occur until more 
complex cognitive thinking had developed.  However, more recent findings (Kenward & 
Dahl, 2011; Meristo & Surian, 2013; Olson & Spelke, 2008) found that 3.5 and 4.5-year-
old toddlers and infants as young as 10 months of age have the capacity to identify 
  
prosocial acts of indirect reciprocity.  These findings will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
  Cohen (1972) would negate any theory that suggests humans have an innate 
biological tendency to behave prosocially, suggesting that humans are innately motivated 
to pursue their own self-interest and they can only achieve prosocial responding through 
sociocultural, rather than genetic, evolution and certain cultural conditions must be met 
before prosocial behavior can occur. However, Olson and Spelke (2008) found evidence 
to support the three principles of kin selection, direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity, 
finding that children of preschool age are more likely to 1) favor (and therefore distribute 
desirable resources) agents that are more similar to themselves, 2) favor individuals that 
have previously acted prosocially toward themselves, and 3) favor others that have acted 
prosocially toward other people. 
Section 5. Neural Correlates of empathic and prosocial behaviors. There have been 
several proposed interpretations that account for infants’ ability to evaluate the social 
valence of another’s actions, including components of theory of mind development and 
perspective taking (discussed below) that mediate infant preference for prosocial 
behavior. Neurophysiologists have linked emotional responding, and subsequently 
empathic and prosocial behaviors, to a variety of neural components.  Recent research 
has attempted to demonstrate a link between recently discovered mirror neurons (Pfeifer, 
Iacoboni, Mazziotta, & Dapretto, 2008), the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), and 
the anterior insula (AI) (Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005; Singer, 2004), to empathy 
responding; the amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex and the insula to general emotional 
responding (Decety & Chaminade, 2003); and the dorsal premotor cortex and inferior 
  
parietal lobe to the perspective taking of others (Ruby & Decety, 2001), an important 
cognitive component in empathic and prosocial responses (Decety & Jackson, 2004; 
Moore, 1990). Each of these neural regions is important to processes underlying prosocial 
responding, but none of which has been directly linked to prosocial responding itself.  
 The majority of previous research on neural correlates of empathic responding has 
focused on empathy evoked by physical pain rather than negative or positive social 
experiences, finding that the dACC and AI as well as the mirror neuron system (MNS) 
may be specific only to affective congruence with another’s pain rather than broad 
empathic experiences (Davis, 2000; Eisenberger, 2003; Peyron, Laurent, Garcia-Larrea, 
2000; Rainville, 2002). More recent research has identified separate regions that activate 
when humans experience empathy for social pain rather than for the physical pain of 
others (Singer, 2006). Thus, affective empathy (the unconscious emotional response to 
emotions of another), and cognitive empathy (the ability to take on the perspective of 
another and understand their emotional response) may rely on distinct neural networks 
(Decety & Meyer, 2008; Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, Perry, 2009).  Observations of 
negative social experiences, such as social exclusion, occur frequently throughout the 
course of an individual’s day, but behavioral data alone are not sufficient to differentiate 
between the two forms of empathic responses, so the exploration of how neural activity is 
related to these experiences is necessary in order to understand how empathy responding 
is related to prosocial behaviors induced by empathy.  
The cognitive component  of empathy differs from the affective not only in terms 
of different neural circuits, but also in that the neural components associated with 
cognitive empathy, which include the ventromedial, medial and dorsomedial prefrontal 
  
cortices, the posterior superior temporal sulcus, the temporal poles, the posterior 
cingulate cortex and the recuneus (VMpFC,; MPFC; DMPFC; pSTS; PCC) and are often 
referred to as the “mentalizing system” (Morelli, Rameson, & Lieberman, 2012) as they 
have been linked to cognitive perspective taking (Masten, Morelli, & Eiseberger, 2011). 
A study by Masten, et al. (2010) provided further support that neural regions associated 
with empathy differed during the observation of social versus physical pain, indicating 
that the previously- mentioned regions associated with cognitive empathy and 
mentalizing are more active during the observation of negative social events.  
Additionally, this study evaluated the relationship between all empathy-related neural 
components (affective and cognitive) and prosocial behavior, and found that greater 
levels of activity in the MPFC and AI increased the likelihood that prosocial responding 
would occur toward the individuals in the negative social event. Supporting research in 
this area highlighted the importance of the mirror neuron system in empathizing events 
that are not context specific (unambiguous physical pain), but not with events in which 
contextual information is required for empathic responding, which were found to be more 
closely associated with activation of the mentalizing system (Morelli, et al., 2012). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that neural circuits associated with cognitive and affective 
empathy are, to some degree, associated with the facilitation of prosocial responding, but 
that the mentalizing system has a more robust relationship to prosocial behavior.   
The aforementioned research underlines the neural components linked to empathy 
that may lead to prosocial motivation through the use of positively and negatively toned 
events, but do not directly address neural activation of observed prosocial versus 
antisocial behaviors in terms of goal directed behaviors, also known as instrumental 
  
helping.  It has been suggested that 10-month-old infants can infer that the goal of one 
animate agent is related to the intention of another animate agent, indicating that their 
preferences involve the use of “second-order mental-state representations” (Hamlin, 
Ullman, Tenenbaum, Goodman, Baker, 2013). The temporal parietal junction and the 
pre-frontal cortex are most often associated with second-order mental-state 
representations. However, the superior temporal sulcus (STS), is found to activate when 
individuals observe an intentional, goal related behavior (Castelli, Happe, Frith, Frith, 
2000), when intentional harm is directed at an animate agent (Decety, 2011), and in the 
presence of emotional facial expressions (Allison, Puce, McCarthy, 2000). Superior 
temporal sulcus activity in infants is thought to be indexed by the P400 ERP component.  
Therefore, Gredeback, et al. (2015) hypothesized that infant P400 ERP component 
indexes processing of actions’ social valence. Using the paradigm of a previously 
conducted study by Hamlin, Wynn, and Bloom (2007) observing infant preferences for 
prosocial behaviors over antisocial behaviors , Gredeback et al. (2015) found that there 
was differential processing in infants when observing prosocial and antisocial actions. 
Specifically, increased activity in the P400 ERP component was observed when the 
infant observed a prosocial action (i.e., an animate agent helping another agent 
accomplish a goal) compared to when the infants observed an antisocial action (i.e. an 
agent hindering another agent from accomplishing a goal). Importantly, this neural 
response only occurred when the agents in the paradigm were animate (i.e. had eyes), 
suggesting that when the social valence is removed from the paradigm, the action is no 
longer interpreted by the infant as being goal-related. Previous behavioral research in this 
area (discussed in greater detail below) documented overt infant preference for prosocial 
  
over antisocial agents as measured by looking times and preferential reaching (Hamlin et 
al., 2007; Hamlin et al., 2010).  As the stimuli from these studies were very closely 
replicated in the Gredeback et al. study, it is “likely that the neural correlates of social 
valence processing demonstrated [in this study] represent the first stages of the neural 
process leading to infants’ expression of prosocial preferences” (Gredeback et al., 2015, 
p. 111). This neural evidence supports the theory that infants younger than 1 year old 
have the capacity to make social evaluations of prosocial actions and actors.  
Additional research focuses on the neural correlates of older infants engaging in, 
as opposed to just observing, prosocial actions in the form of instrumental helping. 
Specifically, the relationship between the frontal and temporal asymmetric brain 
activation was investigated during infant helping and comforting behaviors (Paulus, 
Kuhn-Popp, Licata, Sodian, Meinhardt, 2013).  By comparing resting state brain activity 
of infants at 14 months of age with their neural activity during instrumental helping at 18 
months and comforting behavior at 24 months, Paulus et al. found temporal activation 
asymmetry and instrumental helping to be significantly correlated at 18 months and 
activation in the frontal asymmetry to be significantly correlated with comforting tasks at 
24 months.  
Collectively, this provides further evidence as to the neural underpinnings 
involved in the development of early prosocial behaviors and suggests that multiple 
neurocognitive mechanisms, as opposed to a unitary brain circuit, are involved in 
prosocial responding and may be specific to different types of prosocial behaviors 
(Panksepp, 1986). Finally, the biological factors contributing to prosocial responding 
likely play a role in individual differences of response. However, it is difficult to 
  
ascertain whether these neurological correlates of prosocial action and response are 
causal or consequences of prosociality. 
Section 6. Research on contagious crying in infants. A study by Simner (1971) 
examined the differences in response to different auditory stimuli on newborns of an 
average age of 70 hours. The auditory stimuli in the first experiment included cries of a 5 
½ - month-old female infant, white noise and a control of no noise.  Simner (1971) found 
that infants exposed to the infant cries produced a cry response significantly more than 
the conditions in which white noise was played or no noise was present. A second 
experiment implemented the addition of a synthetic, computer generated cry and the cry 
of a newborn baby and the participant’s own-recorded cry. These auditory stimuli 
resulted in infants crying significantly more to their own cries than the cries of another 
newborn, the cries of the 5 ½-month-old infant and the synthetic cries, respectively.  This 
indicates that infants were able to distinguish the difference between cries of an older 
infant and an infant more similar in age to themselves.  Simner (1971) conducted an 
additional study on infants of an average of 34 hours old using the same audiotapes.  This 
observation yielded similar results, and in these findings Simner (1971) noted a trend in 
the data that suggested that infants would cry more to stimuli that was more congruent 
with an infant’s own cries, but further research would indicate an entirely different 
response of an infant exposed to its own crying stimulus. 
  Martin and Clark (1982) extended the aforementioned findings to determine if 
responses to the crying stimuli were peer- and species-specific in addition to substituting 
a different audio recording to determine if the effect found in the previous studies would 
still occur. When exposed to the cries of another infant, Martin and Clark replicated the 
  
significant main effect in neonates of an average age of 18 hours old.   Interestingly, they 
found that when infants were exposed to recordings of their own distress cries, they 
responded with fewer instances of crying, providing evidence that infants are able to 
make the distinction between their own distress and the distress of a peer of similar age.  
Furthermore, infants who were crying prior to the start of their own crying stimulus 
would cease their distressed behavior. Additional auditory cues of older 11-month-old 
infant cries and the cries of infant primates did not elicit a distress response in the 
subjects. This suggests that there are vocal cues present in the cries of infants similar in 
age to the neonate subjects that prompt a distress response, but that these same cues are 
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